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Our nation relies on law enforcement, fire, and emergency medical services to protect 
citizens when confronted with emergent and hostile events. Mass shootings such as those 
that occurred at Columbine High School; Virginia Tech University; Mumbai, India; and 
Aurora Movie Theatre in Colorado require first responders to incorporate methods and 
tactics that integrate operations and challenge first responders to collaborate and operate 
in a unified manner. 
This research examines how public safety agencies can effectively implement a 
first responder cross-disciplinary plan to better coordinate police, fire, and EMS 
responses. This study begins with a historical review of past incidents that demonstrate 
the need for cross-disciplinary teams. Next, new policies that support the use of cross-
disciplinary teams are examined. Central to this research was an empirical study of the 
enablers and barriers to cross-disciplinary teams during a full-scale active shooter 
exercise. Illustrative findings among the participants in the exercise include a moderately 
high level of confidence in the concept and use of cross-disciplinary teams, the ability of 
various disciplines to trust each other’s ability to work together, and the ability to 
communicate and share information. To establish and enhance the cross-disciplinary 
response, joint operational policies and procedures must be established. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Each day, local fire and emergency medical services (EMS) agencies work with their 
respective law enforcement agencies on myriad routine incidents like structure fires, auto 
accidents, and every-day police events. Less often, they encounter more complex 
incidents such as active shooter(s), acts of terrorism, hostage situations and other delicate 
hostile situations. It is during these complex events that collaboration among agencies 
becomes paramount to effective and safe incident mitigation.   
Complex attacks on civilians such as those that occurred at Columbine High School; 
Virginia Tech University; Mumbai, India, and the Aurora Movie Theatre in Colorado 
require public safety first-responders to incorporate methods and tactics that integrate 
police, fire and EMS operations and challenge first responders to collaborate and operate 
in a unified manner. To safely and effectively mitigate emergent complex, paramilitary 
events, and encourage the collaboration of police, fire and EMS agencies, first responders 
should incorporate response frameworks to include strategic and operational policies that 
are compatible with each other, and align their respective cultures. Analysis of hostile 
incidents such as the Columbine High School shootings shows a need for proactive, 
standardized response plans to include concurrent police, fire and EMS tactical 
operations that necessitate joint incident command structures so that victims have a 
reasonable chance for survival.1 Even so, new response tactics have not been widely 
studied nor implemented.2   
In a 2012 thesis, Paul Atwater examined law enforcements’ past practice and culture 
of waiting for the arrival of specialized teams to mitigate the event, while placing fire and 
EMS personnel in a “standby” or “staged” mode until the incident is declared “safe.”3  
1 United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Wanton Violence at Columbine High School 
(Emmitsburg, MD: United States Fire Administration, National Fire Data Center, 1999), 44 
2 David Kohn. “What Really Happened at Columbine?” CBS News, April 29, 2009.  
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2001/04/17/60II/main286144.shtml. 
3 Paul A. Atwater, “Force Protection for Fire Fighters: Warm Zone Operations at Paramilitary Style, 
Active Shooters Incidents in a Multi-Hazard Environment as a Fire Service Core Competency” (master’s 
thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2012), 16–19. 
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Atwater concluded that this practice was ineffective. Instead, Atwater found that the 
optimal policy for safe and rapid access to victims requires police officers to escort 
firefighters and EMS into the warm zone of unsecured scenes.4   To achieve the fire and 
EMS life-saving mission, Atwater found that police, fire and EMS agencies must change 
their respective disciplines’ culture and alter their operational methodologies and tactics. 
For the fire service, this means discontinuing the use of the “stand by” policy and for law 
enforcement, practicing inter-agency cooperation with the fire service and the use of 
cross-disciplinary teams as force protection and the extraction of victims.5  Atwater 
illustrates that much of the U.S. fire service has been slow to embrace change and update 
policies.  
The current policy of fire and EMS personnel operating in a “standby” mode for 
hostile events is proving to be ineffective and may lead to the unnecessary loss of life by 
delaying timely and effective incident management and operational response.6   The basic 
premise is to initiate medical care as early as possible, often while law enforcement is 
still neutralizing the threat.7 The basic underlying goal of these cross-disciplinary teams 
must be to enhance incident operations by shortening the time required for victims to 
receive potential life-saving medical care, neutralize the potential threats in a rapid and 
efficient manner, and increase the safety for all personnel operating on the incident 
scene.8 
To enhance this goal and as suggested by Atwater (2012), active shooter policies are 
being developed that are asking law enforcement personnel to employ a new policy of 
force protection that will require them to accompany and protect fire fighters in the areas 
with a potential threat to personal safety and health known as the warm zone.9  To deploy 
this new practice of force protection, fire and police departments need to establish joint 
standard operating procedures, guidelines, policies, and procedures that are designed to 







                                                 
mitigate these unusual highly volatile incidents and decrease response time and save 
lives.10  But creating these documents is not sufficient.   
These cross-disciplinary teams must be supported by the development of an action 
guide or policy that includes guidelines for initial responder personnel; establishment of 
unified incident command; and identification of operational actions to integrate police, 
fire and EMS efforts under a common Incident Action Plan (IAP). Clearly, issuing a 
policy is not sufficient for effective integration. Transforming culture, persistently 
refining tactical guidelines, procuring and distributing tactical equipment, along with 
continuous combined training are key considerations necessary to implement new 
response methods.11 In addition, programs, policies and cultural changes need support 
from multiple stakeholders, including senior and mid-level leadership, risk managers, 
city/county attorneys, human resources personnel, and representatives from labor 
organizations.12  They must determine if the investment in a cross-disciplinary program 
is reasonable given the fiscal constraints, as well as the risk and benefits involved for first 
responders.13   
This thesis examines the enablers and barriers to deploying cross-disciplinary teams 
for the purpose of safely and effectively mitigating emergent complex, hostile events. 
These enablers and barriers may include the support and buy-in from leadership and other 
levels of the organization, cultural changes, organizational motivation, return-on-
investment to include available funding and resources, and the development of effective 
policies and procedures. Public safety agencies depend on one another for mitigating 
these complex, hostile events. Without proper coordination and collaboration before, 
during and after these events, the safety of our first responders will be diminished as well 
as the effective mitigation of the incident. 
10 “IAFF Position Statement: Active Shooter Events,” International Association of Fire Fighters, 
accessed December 29, 2013, 
http://www.iaff.org/Comm/PDFs/IAFF_Active_Shooter_Position_Statement.pdf. 
11 Washington Metropolitan Council of Governments, “Law Enforcement Integration with NCR EMS: 
A Review of Tactical Medical Programs in the NCR” (unpublished manuscript). 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid.  
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B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This research tackles one primary question. 
1. How can public safety agencies effectively implement a first responder 
cross-disciplinary action plan to better coordinate police, fire and EMS 
responses in combined hostile events? 
 Secondary questions also are addressed: 
1. What are the enablers and barriers to effectively deploying cross-
disciplinary teams? 
2. What are the benefits of this approach?  What are the risks? 
C. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
This study contributes to the public safety literature. While studies have analyzed 
past practices of specialized teams responding to complex hostile events and have shown 
the need for cross-disciplinary response teams, no studies were found that showed 
statistical analysis of an actual first responder exercise. Likewise, the extant literature 
does little to address “how” public safety agencies might implement cross-disciplinary 
response policies and associated considerations for development and implementation.   
This study should also aid public safety agencies by showing how enablers and 
barriers can be used to develop new policy and procedures, improve training programs, 
and determine aspects of the culture that need to be changed. 
D. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
This study is presented in six chapters. Chapter I includes the problem statement, 
research questions, and significance of the study. Chapter II provides a background for 
the study which includes a description of four past key hostile events and a tabletop 
exercise, considerations for the implementation of a cross-disciplinary tactical response 
policy, and policy reviews for Fairfax County and the United Kingdom. Chapter III 
provides a literature review, including factors that contribute to the success of cross-
disciplinary teams, factors that enhance team effectiveness, barriers and challenges to 
team effectiveness, and the impact of culture on the development of cross disciplinary 
teams. Chapter IV explains the research methods including data collection, data analysis, 
 4 
and the exercise design. Chapter V presents the quantitative and qualitative results of a 
full-scale practical exercise. Chapter VI presents the summary, recommendations, and 
conclusions. 
Complex hostile events to include active shooter type events require the combined 
efforts of many public safety agencies and levels of government working in a unified 
manner. Due to the unique nature of these incidents, the public safety agencies of police, 
fire and EMS must improve their desire and ability to coordinate their efforts and perform 
in a unified manner in the planning, training, response, and mitigation of these complex 
events. The goal of operating in a unified manner with common or shared incident 
objectives should be the primary goal of any incident however multiple goals are 
prevalent at these incidents. These include the safety and security of the public safety 
responders and the citizens, expeditious treatment of injuries, and legal prosecution of 
criminal acts. While each agency has higher priorities for each of these different aspects, 
they are all inter-related in the incident response. The desire of the agencies involved and 
the American public, are that events of this magnitude be mitigated in the shortest 
amount of time, with the least amount of causalities, with justice served to the terrorists 
performing these acts of harm.   
To provide an effective response against these unique incidents, public safety 
agencies must work in a cross-disciplinary manner, developing non-traditional policies, 
training and response procedures to satisfy the agencies’ goals and objectives. History 
has provided us a look into the future, and by analyzing, and learning from past incidents, 
public safety officials are provided an opportunity to learn from past successes and 
failures, and implement change in an effective manner. As a result of past complex 
hostile events, many agencies such as the United States Fire Administration and the 
International Association of Firefighters have begun to advocate for developing response 
guidelines for fire and EMS personnel to jointly work with police counterparts in a cross-
disciplinary manner in the mitigation of these events.1415 The same is holding true for 
14 United States Fire Administration, Fire/Emergency Medical Services Department Operational 
Considerations.  
15 “IAFF Position Statement: Active Shooter Events.” 
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police departments across the country as they change past tactics used in neutralizing the 





This chapter focuses on the historical events that have led to a re-examination of 
how public safety agencies can effectively use and implement a first responder cross-
disciplinary team concept to effectively coordinate police, fire and EMS responses in 
combined hostile events. The review will focus on the historical events surrounding the 
need and development of cross-disciplinary teams, the development of cross-disciplinary 
policies and protocols, and the considerations for implementation of a cross-disciplinary 
tactical response policy.   
Researchers Blair and Martaindale analyzed active shooter events in the United 
States 2000 through 2010. Their research, which examined 84 active shooter events, 
provides fire, EMS and police administrators with empirical evidence and implications 
for training and equipment.16 The researchers also found that many of these events 
involve the disciplines of police, fire, and EMS responding together but failing to act in a 
cross-disciplinary manner. Frequently, fire and EMS operate in a “stand-by” mode and 
thus do not treat the victims in a timely manner.17 The current policy, prevalent in most 
jurisdictions, of EMS personnel not entering the scene until the incident scene or area is 
declared safe by law enforcement allows victims who have been shot or wounded to 
continue to bleed and hemorrhage to death. The research also concludes that the active 
shooter incident scene involves many variables and tasks to include: neutralizing of the 
shooter(s), securing Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), breaching secured areas, and 
medical interventions such as triage, stabilization, treatment and transportation of 
victims.   
While historical events are no guaranteed indication of the future, analysis of past 
events can point to the successes and challenges encountered during these events. They 
can lead public safety officials and responders to implement new and improved policies, 
16 J. Pete Blair and M. Hunter Martaindale, United States Active Shooter Events from 2000 to 2010: 
Training and Equipment Implications (San Marcos, TX: Texas State University, 2013).  
17 Ibid., 6 
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tactics, and procedures that align the operational resources with the environment to which 
public safety first responders operate. The use of cross-disciplinary teams is one such 
improvement that can potentially help save lives.  
B. HISTORICAL EVENTS AND EXERCISES SUPPORTING THE NEED 
FOR CROSS-DISCIPLINARY TEAMS 
Complex tactical incidents require joint fire, EMS and law enforcement efforts.   
High-profile attacks such as Columbine High School, Virginia Tech University, Mumbai, 
India and the Century Movie Theatre in Aurora Colorado, clearly outline differences of 
engaging fire and EMS early in a law enforcement incident. Each of these events 
highlights the need to implement a cross-disciplinary response plan by updating current 
policies, procedures and response methodologies. These events were not chosen simply 
because of their high-profile nature, but each of these events demonstrates the imperative 
nature of engaging fire and EMS earlier in a law enforcement event to limit or prevent the 
unnecessary loss of life. Beginning with Columbine High School in 1999, the United 
States Fire Administration clearly identified the need for rapid rescue and medical 
intervention for tactical teams to reduce the time from incident to the initiation of life 
saving medical treatment if victims were to have any chance of survival.18  The past 
tactics utilized by fire and EMS waiting for the scene to be secured would clearly have to 
be modified. 
1. Columbine High School, Littleton, Colorado, 1999 
On April 20, 1999, in Littleton, Colorado, staff and students at Columbine High 
School became targets of one of the most violent school shootings in history. Two 
juvenile students, Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold, terrorized the school, ultimately killing 
13 people and seriously injuring 24 others.19  After more than year of planning, Harris 
and Klebold, armed with explosive devices, knives, shotguns and automatic pistols, set 
18 DHS, Wanton Violence at Columbine High School, 30. 
19 Ibid., 1. 
 8 
                                                 
out to kill hundreds of their fellow students and anyone who tried to stop them.20  This 
unprecedented terrorist-style assault contained nearly 100 improvised incendiary and 
explosive devices, many of which were intended to harm first responders.21  According 
to the event timeline, the first shots occurred at 11:19 a.m., the last victim was shot at 
11:35 a.m., and Harris and Klebold committed suicide at 12:08 p.m.22 While this was a 
relatively compressed timeline of violence, it was not until 3:44 p.m. that responding 
personnel were able to declare there were no additional survivors.23 
Responding fire and EMS personnel received conflicting information from police 
officers on-scene; some were directed into the scene proximity to rescue injured victims 
while others were directed to remain out of sight.24 Heroic actions were in fact 
undertaken, with fire, EMS and police removing victims from outside the school while in 
harm’s way and sometimes under fire from the assailants.25 A letter written by Jefferson 
County Sherriff John Stone states that the “Columbine attack created a unique set of 
circumstances, the magnitude of which no one had ever dealt with before.”26  Faced with 
incomplete and conflicting information, Sherriff Stone said his officers did exactly what 
they were trained to do, by taking positions around the building and waiting for Special 
Weapons and Tactics Team (SWAT) to arrive.27  Nearly two hours after the first shot 
was fired, a SWAT team finally entered the building to begin the task of neutralizing the 
shooters, who were since dead, and begin the task of identifying and removing victims.28  
For two and one-half hours, these SWAT teams systematically searched the building 
finding most persons dead or near dead. Fire and EMS personnel continued in a stand-by 
20 Tracy L. Frazzano, “Local Jurisdictions and Active Shooters: Building Networks, Building 
Capacities” (master’s degree, Naval Postgraduate School, 2012), 29–30. 
21 DHS, Wanton Violence at Columbine High School, 1. 
22 Frazzano, “Local Jurisdictions and Active Shooters,” 30. 
23 DHS, Wanton Violence at Columbine High School, 54. 
24 Atwater, “Force Protection for Fire Fighters, 26. 
25 DHS, Wanton Violence at Columbine High School, 14. 





                                                 
mode, delaying entry into the building until SWAT could declare the entire building 
safe.29 It was clear from the report by the United States Fire Administrations (USFA) that 
firefighters and law enforcement were presented with challenges to the conventional 
strategies and tactics for fire and rescue agencies and clearly not prepared for the multi-
hazard environment encountered at Columbine.30 
In his thesis, Atwater describes the delay caused by not utilizing cross-disciplinary 
teams: 
Teacher Dave Sanders was in the second group of victims to be shot, at 
approximately 1126 hours. After Sanders escaped to a nearby classroom, a 
student called 911 operators and informed them of Sanders’ condition and 
location. Just before noon, another student hung a makeshift sign out the 
window that said, “one bleeding to death.” At 1208 hours, the assailants 
killed themselves. SWAT personnel entered the building in which Dave 
Sanders was located at 1310 hours. Although Dave Sanders had been 
bleeding for over three hours, he was still alive when SWAT arrived at his 
side an hour and a half later at 1442 hours. Forty-two minutes later, when 
paramedics finally reached him at 1544, Dave Sanders was dead.31 
The delay in medical treatment for the victims contained in the area of threat at 
Columbine has forced public safety and the localities that employ them to re-evaluate the 
strategy of “contain-and-wait” for police and the “stand-by” policy for fire and EMS. 
This recommended shift in strategy was substantiated by Joel Justice who, in his 2013 
thesis, identified the need to change police departments historical tactics of surround, 
contain, and wait for specialized units as the most important lesson that law enforcement 
has learned from the Columbine incident.32 
The United States Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Fire Administrations 
technical report Wanton Violence at Columbine High School provided an analysis of the 
fire and EMS operations and concluded that: 
29 Ibid. 
30 DHS, Wanton Violence at Columbine High School, 44. 
31  Atwater, “Force Protection for Fire Fighters,” 27. 
32 Joel M. Justice, “Active Shooters: Is Law Enforcement Ready for a Mumbai Style Attack?” 
(master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2013), 27.  
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Hostile, multi-hazard situations – including acts of wanton violence – 
challenge the fire/EMS service to respond with nontraditional tactics and 
to operate under a unified incident command structure with law 
enforcement. Joint operations and unified command between law 
enforcement, fire and EMS are critical to successfully manage response to 
incidents ranging from natural disasters to acts of terror.33 
The analysis of the Columbine attack in Littleton, Colorado, has changed the way 
police, fire and EMS conduct operations. The USFA report recommends training fire and 
EMS responders in the actions of law enforcement, joint training initiatives, identifying 
and providing ballistic protection to fire and EMS personnel, and the promotion of 
policies, practices, and protocols to use common terminology and jargon among 
disciplines.34 While the creation of cross-disciplinary teams were not immediately called 
for after this event, it was soon after that first responders and the public began to realize 
the need for fire and EMS to engage earlier into the incidents timeline. 
2. Virginia Tech University, Blacksburg, Virginia, 2007 
On April 16, 2007, Virginia (VA) Tech student Seung-Hui Cho entered West 
Ambler-Johnston Hall at approximately 7:15 a.m., shot two victims, and then fled the 
scene. These shootings prompted an emergency response from the Virginia Tech and 
Blacksburg police departments and subsequent investigation into the two fatal 
shootings.35 At approximately 9:15 a.m., as the investigation progressed, Cho entered 
Norris Hall where he began a shooting spree, ultimately killing 32 students and 
professors and wounding an additional 25.36  At 9:52 a.m., the last shot was heard, Cho 
killing himself with a gunshot to the head.   
At 10:09 a.m., fire and EMS were advised that the scene was secured and 
personnel began a thorough survey of the incident scene, continuing the triage 
and treatment of the wounded begun by the tactical medics assigned to the 
33 DHS, Wanton Violence at Columbine High School, 2, 30. 
34 Ibid., 30–32. 
35 John P. Giduck and Walter D. Chi, An Evaluation and Assessment of the Law Enforcement Tactical 
Response to the Virginia Tech University Shootings of Monday, 16 April 2007 (Golden, CO: Archangel 
Group, LTD., 2008), 12. 
36 Atwater, “Force Protection for Fire Fighters,” 32. 
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police department’s entry team. The last injured person was removed from Norris Hall at 
10:51 a.m.37  This effort was enhanced because tactical medics accompanied the law 
enforcement emergency response team during initial assessment, and  it was quickly 
determined the scene was secure, thus allowing  remaining EMS personnel to enter and 
complete medical efforts started earlier.   
Both the Blacksburg police department and the Virginia Tech campus police operated 
with a tactical medic assigned to their emergency response teams (ERTs) and both were 
requested early in the incident and immediately deployed on scene at West Ambler-
Johnston Hall and Norris Hall.38  While not a full cross-disciplinary team of fire and 
EMS, the ERT did maintain medical treatment capability, which proved invaluable. 
During this incident, the goal of the tactical medics were two-fold; identify the number of 
victims who were alive or dead, and to move ambulatory victims to a safe area where 
further triage and treatment could begin.39  It was just 37 minutes after the first shot in 
Norris Hall, that tactical medics accompanied police officers into the building to begin 
the process of patient triage and treatment.40  The triage of victims by tactical medics 
occurred just two minutes after their arrival at Norris Hall, where tactical medics 
continued moving the wounded to a safe area where further triage and treatment could be 
initiated. It was here that the tactical medics initiated advanced lifesaving care to include 
sealing penetrating chest wounds and controlling arterial bleeding.41   
According to the after-action review by the Archangel Group, the delay on active 
shooter incidents between SWAT being called out and readied for deployment is 30 
minutes to 2 hours, with an average time being 45 minutes to an hour.42   Both the 
Virginia Tech and Blacksburg ERTs were mobilized by 8:15 a.m. and were assembled, 
organized, tasked and positioned by 9:15 a.m., leading to the conclusion by Archangel’s 
37 Ibid., 33. 
38 Giduck and Chi, An Evaluation and Assessment of the Law Enforcement Tactical Response, 15–16.  
39 Virginia Tech Review Panel, Mass Shootings at Virginia Tech: Addendum to the Report of the 
Review Panel (Arlington, VA: TriData Division, System Planning Corporation, 2009), 104. 
40 Atwater, Force Protection for Fire Fighters, 32. 
41 Ibid., 33. 
42 Giduck and Chi, An Evaluation and Assessment of the Law Enforcement Tactical Response, 108. 
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report that both departments’ decision to mobilize their ERTs met the “highest standard 
and duty that could be applied to the law enforcement handling of the West Ambler-
Johnston Hall shootings.”43  The report also suggested that all officers undergo Tactical 
Combat Casualty Care (TCCC) training, which is now being incorporated in the form of 
Tactical Emergency Casualty Care (TECC) training in many of the identified tactical 
response policies. 
The report of the Virginia Tech Review Panel concluded with several key 
findings that have led to changes in the cross-disciplinary response and changes within 
the police, fire and EMS disciplines. The report concluded that there was little evidence 
of a unified command structure at the Virginia Tech incident, instead several command 
posts and separate command structures were established.44 It concluded that a unified 
command structure could have led to less confusion, better use of resources, better 
direction of personnel, and a safe working environment.45  One of the most profound and 
influential findings by the Virginia Tech Review Panel were that 
Police cannot wait for SWAT teams to arrive and assemble, but must 
attack an active shooter at once using the first officers arriving on the 
scene, which was done. The officers entering the building proceeded to the 
second floor just as the shooting stopped. The sound of the shotgun blast 
and their arrival on the second floor probably caused Cho to realize that 
attack by the police was imminent and to take his own life. Police did a 
highly commendable job in starting to assist the wounded, and worked 
closely with the first EMTs on the scene to save lives.46 
The report also acknowledged the close relationship of the Virginia Tech Police 
Department and Blacksburg Police Department, the establishment of an effective mutual 
aid arrangement, and their frequent joint training, which saved critical minutes and 
lives.47  This relationship and the integration of EMS through the use of tactical medical 
43 Ibid. 
44 Virginia Tech Review Panel, Mass Shootings at Virginia Tech, 119–120 
45 Ibid., 120. 
46 Ibid., 99. 
47 Ibid., 99. 
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personnel during the initial response was a clear indication that cross-disciplinary tactics 
and training do indeed lead to a faster treatment of victims and that lives can be saved.  
3. Mumbai, India, 2008 
On November 26, 2008, a terrorist attack occurred in the city of Mumbai which 
killed at least 172 people.48  This unprecedented style  of attack lasted for over 60 hours, 
allowing the Pakistan-based terrorist group Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) to inflict fear and 
chaos in a city with a history of terrorist attacks, such as the July 2006 bombing on a 
Mumbai commuter train that  left 209 dead.49  This November 2008 attack involved 10 
attackers arriving by sea, dividing themselves into four separate teams, and initiating 
multiple attacks on targets including the central train station, the Cama & Albless 
Hospital, the Leopold Café, the Chabad center, the Trident-Oberoi Hotel, and the Taj 
Mahal Palace Hotel. The attacks combined armed assaults, carjackings, drive-by-
shootings, prefabricated IEDs, targeted killings, barricade and hostage situations, and 
building takeovers at various soft target locations utilizing simple  of assault weapons, 
hand grenades, simple IEDs and basic communications equipment and GPS locators.50Is 
this the right phrase “simple of”?  The Rand Corporation report, The Lessons of Mumbai, 
provided that the multiple attacks at different locations prevented the authorities from 
developing an overall assessment of the situation and lack of command and control of the 
situation.51  Insurgency specialist Bruce Hoffman defines terrorism as violence or the 
threat of violence that is used and directed in pursuit of, or in service of, a political aim.52 
It was clear from this attack and the testimony of the lone surviving terrorist that the 
attacker’s purpose was to inflict slaughter by killing as many people as possible, making 
the rapid insertion of a cross-disciplinary police, fire and EMS response even more 
imperative.53     
48 Angel Rabasa et al., The Lessons of Mumbai (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2009), 1. 
49 Ibid., 1. 
50 Ibid., 5. 
51 Ibid.  
52 Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York.: Columbia University Press, 2006), 432. 
53 Rabasa et al., The Lessons of Mumbai, 6. 
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The Indian government’s response highlighted several key weaknesses to include 
inadequate execution of response protocols in the form of training to set-up and establish 
appropriate command posts; delayed response by the specialized assets of the Indian 
military; inadequate counterterrorism training and equipment for the local police; 
limitations in training and equipment as well as the delayed response of the municipal fire 
and emergency services; flawed hostage-rescue plans; and poor strategic communication 
and information management to the citizens of Mumbai.54   
The response by the local police and the Anti-Terrorism Squad was relatively 
quick but ill-prepared, as was evidenced by the lack of training to set-up command posts, 
lack of ability to seal off attack sites, and inadequate firearms to engage the terrorists.55  
The municipal Fire and Emergency Services, which suffered from inadequate equipment 
and training and were slow to respond, failed to coordinate its actions with the local 
police or more advanced forces of Marine Commandos (MARCOS) and the National 
Security Guard (NSG).56 It was some five hours after the first shot that assistance from 
the local army and MARCOS arrived, with the more advanced teams of the NSG not 
arriving for over eight hours after the first shot, which was when the terrorists were 
seriously engaged.57   
The local police department, municipal fire and emergency services, and the 
advanced military assets demonstrated a flawed counterterrorism response plan and 
capabilities by failing to coordinate their actions with communications. Footnote or your 
idea? The lack of  coordinated response plans, and the training and equipment necessary 
to contain and stop the firearms assault all proved deadly to the citizens of India’s 
commercial and entertainment center. It was clear from this incident that not only was a 
cross-disciplinary response not initiated between the various responding services, but a 
lack of tactical policies and procedures for dealing with events such as this caused an 
excessive delay in the delivery of medical treatment, no less transport. 
54 Ibid., 9–12. 
55 Ibid., 10. 
56 Ibid., 11. 
57 Ibid., 10. 
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4. Aurora Movie Theatre, Aurora, Colorado, 2012 
On July 20, 2012, over 400 moviegoers gathered at Theatre 9 of the Century 16 
Movie Theatre in Aurora, Colorado, for the midnight showing of the new Batman film, 
The Dark Knight Rises. Shortly after the movie began, their evening of entertainment 
quickly turned to tragedy. Dressed like a SWAT officer, James Holmes, a single gunman, 
opened fire on the guests as they sat in their seats, and then disbursed tear gas grenades 
into the theater. Holmes was apprehended by Aurora police shortly after he exited the 
theatre, but not before he killed 12 people and injured an additional 58.58   
The 911 calls from the theater began almost immediately, and Aurora police 
officers were praised for their quick and heroic response.59 They arrived on the scene 
within 60 to 90 seconds, entering the impact area and theaters, utilizing lessons learned 
from Columbine and not subscribing to the past practices of contain and wait.60  The 
dispatch for a single paramedic engine and battalion command officer came just two 
minutes later, arriving on the scene in 4 minutes 59 seconds.61  A staging area and 
incident command was established for responding fire and EMS units, but this was 
quickly overloaded with citizens, police, fire and EMS asking for help and assignments.62   
While the police response was fast, quickly apprehending the subject and 
initiating a search of the theater, the fire and EMS response into the theater area was 
delayed, hampered by an active paving operation underway,  parking lots completely 
filled with cars, police vehicles responding and rapidly establishing a perimeter around 
the scene, 1,400 frantic moviegoers running from the theaters and into the parking lot, 
and bleeding victims surrounding emergency vehicles that approached the incident, 
58 Justice, “Active Shooters: Is Law Enforcement Ready for a Mumbai Style Attack?” 31. 
59 Ronnie Garrett, “Lessons Learned from Aurora: The Batman Movie Atrocity Will Change the 
Tactics You Use to Respond to Active Shootings and How You Provide Care for the Victims,” Police 
Magazine, August 17, 2012, http://www.policemag.com/channel/swat/articles/2012/08/lessons-learned-
from-aurora.aspx. 
60 Ibid. 
61 City of Aurora, Century Theatre Shooting: Aurora Fire Department Preliminary Analysis (Aurora, 
CO: City of Aurora, 2013), 14. 
62 Ibid., 21. 
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making driving further nearly impossible.63  The responding fire and EMS units were 
inundated with injured persons seeking treatment, causing fire and EMS personnel to stop 
and treat victims before reaching the staging area or the physical scene of Theatre 9.64  
The circumstances of fire and EMS not gaining access to the scene, thus having an 
inadequate number of transport units and  forcing victims to be transported by police 
units, highlights the need for -established policies for complex hostile events. These 
policies would require frequent review and training, adequate communication among 
disciplines, and cross-disciplinary entry teams. This would allow the police to provide 
force protection while fire and EMS provide patient triage, lifesaving casualty care, 
extraction from the area of threat, and transportation to a medical facility with appropriate 
medically trained personnel providing care. Training law enforcement in immediate 
casualty care to include basic triage, casualty collection and hemorrhage control have 
also been pointed out as a potential lesson learned in the Aurora movie theatre 
shooting.65 These tactics, coupled with competent unified command and control, will 
allow coordination and collaboration among the responding disciplines of police, fire and 
EMS. 
In the end, 70 people were transported to area hospitals, with 12 succumbing to 
their injuries. In the first 20 minutes of the incident, 18 patients were transported by 
police and 5 by EMS responders.66 In the next 20 minutes, 4 were transported by police 
and 12 by EMS, equating to police transporting 22 patients and EMS units transporting 
17 in the first 50 minutes of the incident.67 While the police officers responding to 
Theatre 9 changed their tactics since Columbine to meet to needs of the incident, the 
circumstances of inadequate access proved to be detrimental to the responding fire and 
EMS units, causing delays in units reaching the incident scene and providing transport 
capabilities. With a lack of cross-disciplinary teams established, each responder operated 
63 Ibid., 16. 
64 Ibid., 20. 
65 Garrett, “Lessons Learned from Aurora,” 
http://www.policemag.com/channel/swat/articles/2012/08/lessons-learned-from-aurora.aspx. 
66 City of Aurora, Century Theatre Shooting, 8–10. 
67 Ibid. 
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to the best of their ability but often without the coordination and integration needed to 
effectively merge the police, fire and EMS response. 
5. Tabletop Exercise, Fairfax County, Virginia, 2013 
In 2013, the Emergency Management Program Office for a secure federal agency 
hosted a one-day active shooter tabletop exercise at their facility site in Fairfax County, 
Virginia. This event was conducted approximately eight months prior to the 
implementation of the full-scale active shooter practical exercise that provided the data 
for this thesis research. The tabletop attendees represented the internal staff of the agency 
to include the administrative, security, facility response staff, and external agencies 
consisting of local first responders representing law enforcement and fire and rescue 
department staff that would actually respond to an active shooter threat at this facility. 
Participants were provided with the purpose of the tabletop exercise, which was to 
understand the agencies’, and the local first responders’ roles and responsibilities when 
responding to an active shooter event at the facility. The tabletop exercise was also used 
to test the validity of the Fairfax County Unified Hostile Event Action Guide, which 
included the implementation of a first responder cross-disciplinary response strategy. It 
also included the evaluation of the emergency response plans of the federal facility. 
Participating agencies discussed the facilities’ tactical response protocols and determined 
how those protocols and response by facility staff would be coordinated with local police, 
fire and EMS personnel.   
During the tabletop exercise, the exercise players participated in a question-and-
answer session facilitated by the agency administrators. Information was collected by the 
federal entity through 15 questions (See Appendix A) that were administered by the 
Emergency Management Program Office for the agency administrating the exercise. The 
15 questions were organized and presented in the appropriate emergency management 
incident phase of: mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery. The questions were 
intended to generate discussion and feedback regarding the participants’ intended actions 
during each phase of the simulated incident. All of the questions and answers were 
captured by the evaluators in the review (hotwash) immediately following the exercise 
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and later published in an After-Action Report (AAR) by the federal agency sponsoring 
the exercise.68 These results included both enablers and barriers to meeting the tabletop 
objective, the discussion of relevant issues, and recommendations for improvement.   
While the AAR established six specific objectives that were established by the 
agency administrators for the tabletop exercise, analysis of the AAR provided recognized 
two general themes that support the need for cross-disciplinary teams. These themes 
include: 
• The need for the establishment of agency and public safety emergency 
response protocols  for a mass casualty or active shooter incident that 
enable coordination of facility staff with local law enforcement, fire and 
EMS. These protocols should identify and support the integration of 
security, police, and fire and rescue into a combined cross-disciplinary 
tactical response. 
• The response team methodology for processing casualty information and 
personal accountability requirements between the agency and public safety 
responders. 
The establishment of agency and public safety emergency response protocols for 
a mass casualty or active shooter incident that enables coordination of facility staff with 
local law enforcement, fire and EMS is a major theme received from the completion of 
the tabletop exercise. The exercise identified that these protocols should identify and 
support the integration of security, police, and fire and rescue into a combined cross-
disciplinary tactical response. As a result of this exercise, several issues related to the 
implementation of combined law enforcement, fire, and EMS cross-disciplinary response 
were identified. These include the: 
• Lack of familiarity with each other’s protocols and response procedures to 
include civilian agency staff and public safety responders. The exercise 
players discussed the lack of coordination of resources, and lack of a clear 
understanding of authority to support the multiple agency response. This 
included the identification of each other’s staff and uniforms. 
• Lack of established policies and procedures or memoranda of 
understanding that codify the joint response among the federal, state and 
local public safety responders and the civilian responders. 
68 U.S. government, Active Shooter Tabletop Exercise (TTX) After Action Report (AAR) (unpublished 
manuscript, 2013).   
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• Need for regularly established training for the responders and workforce to 
exercise the facility workforce evacuation and response policies and 
procedures.  
• Identification of disparate procedures and lack of awareness for accessing 
and extracting victims in a complex hostile event where the area has not 
been rendered secure. While the participating agency and public safety 
first responders each may have their own operational procedures, this 
issue identified the need for joint information sharing, need for  
established operational policies and procedures, and training on the 
procedures established. The goal is to ensure that the operational 
procedures developed by the federal agency are in accordance with the 
protocols and response methodology of the local public safety responders 
and that the established protocols and methodology of the public safety 
responders align with the expectations and response of the various 
community and business organizations and their workforce. 
The response team methodology for processing casualty information and personal 
accountability requirements between the agency and public safety responders is another 
theme extracted from the tabletop exercise. This is a critical issue not only for the federal 
agency but for police, fire and rescue, and the tracking of patients. The federal agency has 
a responsibility to track and maintain accountability of their workers, while fire and 
rescue has the same responsibility for all of the victims in the incident. In addition, law 
enforcement may have a need to perform future questioning of the victims that are 
transported or released. Having an accountability system that includes a federal facility 
representative assigned to the command post and area hospitals would improve joint 
information sharing and effective processing of victim information to include their 
individual status.69 The agency must designate persons or sections responsible for the 
coordination of this information and victim status. This is in addition to established 
policies and procedures for the method of patient tracking in a fire and EMS response. 
The tabletop exercise provided a forum and learning environment for public and 
private response personnel to discuss potential issues prior to the execution of the full-
scale active shooter exercise. The tabletop exercise allowed the response entities for the 
participating agency, local law enforcement and fire and rescue to discuss their response 
69 Ibid.   
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capabilities, authorities, roles and responsibilities and allowed personnel and agencies to 
clarify their response procedures during active shooter events. The tabletop exercise also 
allowed agency staff and public safety responders the opportunity to discuss any barriers 
to the implementation of a cross-disciplinary response, which is a key aspect of the full-
scale active shooter exercise. The issues, discussion, and recommendations of the 
tabletop exercise were later published in the AAR. 
6. Conclusion 
The impact of Columbine paved the way for new ways for law enforcement to 
engage, isolate, and neutralize the active shooter threat. Whether using a four-officer, 
diamond or Y formation, a two-person response, or the actions of a single police officer, 
the transition from isolate, contain and wait for SWAT, to the immediate entry of patrol 
officers, seemed to occur overnight.70  This immediate entry approach is forcing a 
paradigm shift, allowing the formation of cross-disciplinary teams consisting of properly 
trained and equipped fire and EMS personnel into a warm zone to affect life saving 
measures.71  Based upon his research, Justice recommends: 
Emergency management service personnel and paramedics need to be 
trained with police officers and create joint teams where first responding 
resources are prepared both for engaging and neutralizing threats as well 
as providing life-sustaining treatment to the injured.72 
The active shooter events reviewed have provided a comparison of past strategies 
and tactics, and have illustrated the need and effect of rapid intervention by police, fire 
and EMS resources in a cross-disciplinary manner. The four historical events provide a 
clear indication of the problems associated with not responding to hostile incidents in a 
cross-disciplinary manner. These include a delay in the initiation of life saving medical 
care, delayed transport times and the lack of a unified response plan that provides the 
basis for the joint establishment of cross-disciplinary policies and procedures. The action 
taken at Virginia Tech provide us a glimpse of cross-disciplinary personnel working 
70 Ed Sanow, “Latest Active Shooter Tactics,” Law & Order 61, no. 10 (2013). 
71 Ibid. 
72 Justice, “Active Shooters: Is Law Enforcement Ready for a Mumbai Style Attack?” 70. 
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together to help save lives, so just think of what a full cross-disciplinary response to 
hostile or active shooter events could provide. This initiation of a proactive cross-
disciplinary response strategy and abandonment of the past strategies of “contain and 
wait” by police and “stand-by “policy by fire and EMS will allow the appropriate 
lifesaving resources and interventions to neutralize the threat(s) while simultaneously 
saving lives in the shortest amount of time.  
C. POLICY DEVELOPMENT 
1. Overview  
Prior to June 2011, the Fairfax County Police Department, and Fire and Rescue 
Department in Fairfax County, Virginia, operated just like the majority of other agencies 
across the county, acting independently on the scene of incidents requiring joint tactical 
operations. Based upon historical experience, fire and rescue personnel called to the 
scene of an unsecured law enforcement incident or an incident involving weapons 
“staged” in a safe area until police declared the scene secure. Although predominately an 
unwritten policy, this tactic was supported by a Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) 
which directed units to identify a staging area until task forces or strike teams could be 
formed during potential hostile operations.73 Fire and EMS personnel continued to stage 
until law enforcement neutralized the threat or secured the scene and identified it was 
safe for fire and EMS personnel to begin medical care and treatment. During incidents, 
fire and EMS personnel rarely interacted with police in a cross-disciplinary manner and 
each agency made decisions based upon past practice and training. Many internal AARs 
from previous incidents and fire and rescue department training sessions such as the 1999 
active shooter training in a high school in Fairfax County, VA, noted that police officers 
often overlooked staged fire and EMS resources, causing detrimental delays in fire and 
EMS reaching the scene and initiating patient care. As an aside, it should be noted that 
during high-profile or pre-planned incidents of a tactical nature, the Police Department 
73 Ronald L. Mastin, “Standard Operating Procedure 05.02.02, Hostile Environment Task Force 
Operations” (Fairfax, VA: Fairfax County Fire and Rescue Department and Fairfax County, September 
2008). 
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engaged the use of police tactical paramedics primarily responsible for the safety of 
responding police officers.   
Historically when responding to hostile incidents, police began operations to 
neutralize the threat or stabilize the scene. Formal command was rarely established; each 
officer carried out their duties according to training they had received, and establishment 
of a combined IAP was rare. This response methodology charged no one with the 
responsibility to declare the scene status, causing confusion for incoming personnel. It 
was these tactical decisions and past practices that caused delays in medical care and 
transport of the victims who needed advanced medical intervention to save their lives. 
It is the goal of policy development for any hostile or active shooter event to 
provide basic standardization of strategic and tactical response initiatives, accountability 
for the completion of operational assignments, implementation of tactical operations 
involving police, fire and EMS in a faster timeframe, and the result that an effective and 
coordinated unified response policy will save lives through shorter response times.   
2. Identified Concerns 
Throughout history, numerous events have required police, fire, and EMS to work 
effectively on the scene of hostile or tactical events. Often, these events are handled in a 
routine manner with each agency performing their assigned duties in a professional and 
competent manner. To identify potential problems, successes or concerns, fire and police 
agencies utilize a “debrief” or “hotwash” session for responding personnel to come 
together post-incident and discuss the response in a more stable environment. Debrief or 
hotwash sessions and AARs revealed several concerns and issues regarding response 
tactics used during incidents, and included comments and possible solutions suggested by 
responding personnel to improve future responses.74  Typically law enforcement officers 
responded directly to the scene, while fire and EMS personnel staged in a safe area. 
Scenes were secured fairly quickly by responding police officers with fire and EMS 
personnel being notified without delay that the scene was secure for them to respond. The 
74 Purvis L. Dawson, “Police and Fire Debrief” Fairfax County Police Department (unpublished 
manuscript, September 2009). 
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key identified problem/obstacles encountered during combined events centered on a lack 
of communication between agencies, resulting in confusion and each agency being 
unsure of the other’s tactics.75  Other issues identified included a lack of joint protocols 
for dealing with combined hostile incidents, lack of effective unified command, no 
established command post, lack of perceived awareness of scene security, confusion of 
terms such as “safe” and “secure,” lack of confirmation on exact location, and failure to 
use the available combined tactical radio channel.76  Possible solutions identified, 
included establishing unified command, timely updates and coordinated information from 
controlling dispatch centers, the use of coordinated radio channels, increased/enhanced 
communication, future training, defining key terms and sharing/awareness of each other’s 
protocols.77  
Training is often conducted to identify strengths and weaknesses in a particular 
subject area so improvements can be made. One such training exercise, classified as an 
“active shooter” exercise, occurred in October 1999 at Falls Church High School in Falls 
Church, Virginia. According to internal operational guidance, the purpose of the multi-
agency exercise was to “evaluate police and fire and rescue departments’ response to an 
active shooter event when met with numerous casualties including law enforcement 
officers.”  As described in the Mass Casualty/Active Shooter OPS Plan, responding 
police and fire personnel had no previous knowledge of the exercise details, which 
included over 200 role players and victims, and involved full complements of response 
personnel along with units from police, fire and EMS. The exercise centered on an initial 
911 call reporting a person slumped over the wheel of a vehicle in the school parking lot. 
Dispatched for an accident with injury, responding fire and rescue, and law enforcement 
personnel quickly discovered the person had been shot and were suddenly met with 
gunfire erupting from a lone active shooter emerging from the school. Besides gunfire, 





                                                 
scene school resource police officers, panicked students and faculty, a fire erupting inside 
the school and total lack of scene security.   
The exercise AAR and written statements by evaluators found many of the same 
issues and concerns identified in earlier incidents as well as those identified in Columbine 
in 1999. These included panic and fear demonstrated by initial fire and EMS personnel, 
absence of a formal incident command post or identified officer in charge, fire and EMS 
staging with little or no direction from police regarding scene status, denial of entry to 
fire by police resulting in an uncontrolled fire, delayed medical triage and care, lack of 
scene security by police with chaos resulting outside of the school, no initial unified 
command resulting in a lack of information sharing, no combined IAP or incident 
objectives, uncoordinated search patterns, lack of personnel accountability, lack of 
clearly defined work zones, no use of combined coordination radio channels, confusion 
of terms such as safe and secure and Hot, Warm and Cold zones, and no combined 
integration of police, fire or EMS in the tactical components of the incident.78  It was 
these concerns that prompted officials to initiate a change in policy to correct the 
deficiencies noted. 
3. Integrated Response Frameworks  
Response frameworks are currently being developed and implemented across the 
country allow cross-disciplinary teams to coordinate, thus ensuring a unified command 
presence among responding agencies. Localities such as Arlington County, Virginia; City 
of Fairfax, Virginia; Montgomery County, Maryland and Fairfax County, Virginia, are 
presently implementing integrated fire, EMS and police response to paramilitary and 
conventional terrorist events.79 Police, fire and EMS have worked collaboratively to 
redefine response strategies and tactics to effectively mitigate the ever changing threats 
first responders’ encounter.   
78 Ibid. 
79 Reed Smith Jr., Blake Iselin, and Scott McKay, “Toward the Sound of Shooting,” Jems, December 
2009, 49. 
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One such regional framework is the Washington Metropolitan Council of 
Government’s (COG) Law Enforcement and Emergency Medical Services (LEEMS) 
workgroup. The LEEMS workgroup and subsequent model framework’s purpose “is to 
provide the response framework for combined law enforcement and fire and emergency 
medical services on the scene of a law enforcement incident. Having this framework is 
intended to facilitate the rapid and effective movement of victims through areas on the 
incident scene, while also promoting the highest chance of victim and responder 
survival.”80 The scope of the LEEMS workgroup is to provide a framework for joint 
public safety agency personnel responding to incidents that include, but are not limited to 
active shooter events, hostage/barricade, high-risk warrants, civil disturbances, jail/
correctional facility riots.81  While response frameworks such as LEEMS can be 
implemented on a regional level, each individual locality must identify specific policies 
and procedures to effectively implement an effective and coordinated response. It is these 
integrated response policies and procedures that will provide the “rules of engagement” 
and provide unified and commonly understood tactical operations. 
4. Fairfax County, Virginia 
In Fairfax County, Virginia, the Fairfax County Unified Hostile Incident Action 
Guide was completed in June 2011 to coincide with the integrated response framework 
identified by LEEMS. This document outlines a response framework allowing police, fire 
and EMS personnel to effectively operate in a combined tactical nature and establish a 
unified command presence during the initial response period.82  This action guide 
provides guidelines for responding personnel to follow during initial response, establishes 
unified incident command, and identifies operational actions designed to integrate police 
and fire efforts toward establishing a common Incident Action Plan (IAP) for mitigating 
the incident collaboratively and safely. 
80 Washington Metropolitan Council of Governments, “Law Enforcement Integration with NCR EMS: 
A Review of Tactical Medical Programs in the NCR” (unpublished manuscript). 
81 Ibid. 
82 Cindy McAlister et al., Unified Hostile Incident Action Guide (Fairfax, VA: Fairfax County Fire 
and Rescue and Fairfax County Police Department, 2011).  
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The Fairfax County fire and police workgroup tasked with the establishment of 
this joint policy assessed how best to successfully initiate a culture shift to a team 
approach when responding jointly to hostile events. This would be accomplished by 
successfully developing and implementing joint policies, and practicing those tactics 
during joint tactical training exercises and information sharing sessions. Utilizing this 
two-pronged approach, the workgroup’s main goal was to develop the Unified Hostile 
Incident Action Guide to provide both agencies with a unified operational response 
framework. The guide’s intent was to ensure coordination between agencies, effective 
scene control, patient treatment, and evidence preservation while maintaining the safety 
of emergency personnel. Secondly, the establishment of a cross-disciplinary Rescue 
Team program was provided which integrated fire and police crews to enter warm zones 
to affect the rescue of injured persons. A training video to complement the action guide 
was developed and released after the release of the guide. 
By reviewing former fire and police joint tactical operations exercises, training 
sessions, and events, the review indicated problems with joint responses continually 
repeated themselves, and recommended changes fell through the cracks or were 
ignored.83  Immediate areas of concern included: lack of unified command between 
police and fire; problems created by fire’s policy for staging and waiting until the scene is 
“secure”; lack of coordination when joint interaction is required; and lack of common 
terminology across agencies.  
Phase two of the implementation of the Fairfax County Unified Hostile Incident 
Action Guide will be to implement the establishment of Rescue Task Forces (RTF), 
Extraction Task Forces (ETF) and the medical principles associated with TECC. RTF as 
defined in Fairfax County is: 
A combined team consisting of two assigned Fire Department personnel in 
body armor, paired with a minimum of two assigned Police Department 
officers. Fire Department personnel are tasked with initial treatment and 
triage of wounded. The Police Department officers are assigned as the 
force protection for this team, and may not separate from the Fire 
83 Dawson, “Police and Fire Debrief” (unpublished manuscript, September 2009).  
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Department personnel. Multiple task forces may be assigned as needed 
(number and location of patients). RTFs will operate in a WARM area.84  
ETFs are defined as: 
 
A large team of FD personnel tasked with moving patients from an impact 
area to an extraction point with a minimum of two assigned PD officers. 
This team may operate within the Warm Zone. The PD officers are 
assigned as the force protection for this team, and may not separate from 
it.85  
To provide validation to the guide’s development and identify any needed 
changes, a number of joint police and fire hands-on scenario-based training sessions have 
been conducted with additional ones planned.   
Preceding the development of the Fairfax County Unified Hostile Incident Action 
Guide was the RTF program in the Arlington County Fire and Rescue Department and 
the City of Fairfax Fire Department where teams composed of law enforcement officers 
and firefighters/paramedics engage in cross-disciplinary response to combat threats 
during the initial operational period. Utilizing the guidelines of TECC and associated 
medical equipment and ballistic protection, Arlington County’s and the City of Fairfax’s 
RTF model has provided a set of teams that move forward into the unsecured scene along 
secured corridors to provide stabilizing care and evacuation of the injured under the 
protection of law enforcement.86  While similar in nature, established programs do have 
variances in personnel assignments, certifications or capabilities of responding agencies 
and personnel, and specific tactics used to accomplish the overall goal of faster treatment 
and transport times of the victims. As an example, in past training involving 44 victims, 
Arlington County has been able to demonstrate a faster victim contact and evacuation 
time of 30 minutes in a RTF response versus 2.5 hours in a traditional non-RTF 
response.87   
84 Fairfax County Fire and Rescue Department and Fairfax County Police Department, Joint Event 
Action Guide (unpublished manuscript, 2014). 
85 Ibid. 2. 
86 Smith, Iselin and McKay, “Toward the Sound of Shooting,” 52. 
87 Ibid., 54. 
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5. United Kingdom Approach 
While the United States fire, EMS and police services rely on individual regions 
or localities to implement specific policy, the United Kingdom (UK) operates much 
differently as part of a national response framework. The UK is no stranger to acts of 
violence and terrorism, which include many of the same strategic and operational 
problems as those facing the U.S. The coroner’s inquest that followed the 2005 London 
bombings indicated that there was a lack of inter-agency training that led to initial chaos, 
confusion and carnage.88 The 2010 shootings in Cumbria, England, highlighted the 
different risk thresholds employed by the three “Blue Light” services of police, fire and 
ambulance service.89  Following these incidents and many others, the UK implemented 
national policies to provide a unified framework and provide for joint emergency services 
interoperability among the three Blue Light services.90 In the United States, events 
known as “Hostile Events” or “Active Shooter” events are classified as a “Marauding 
Terrorist Firearms Attack” (MTFA) in the UK.91 
In 2009, the National Policing Improvement Agency issued the Guidance on 
Multi-Agency Interoperability, which provided a unified framework that enhanced 
practices for communications and coordination across the command and control 
structures. This guidance set forth how and when the principles of interoperability should 
be employed and at what level they should be used within the organizations.92  Another 
document, the Emergency Response and Recovery guidance, compliments emergency 
preparedness and sets out how the duties under the Civil Contingencies Act of 2004 and 
its supporting regulations should be implemented. This document focuses on guiding 
principles, practical considerations, and operational procedures for the emergency 
88 JESIP Engagement Manager and Senior Users, JESIP–Programme Definition Document and HM 
Government Response (United Kingdom: Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Programme, 2013), 4..  
89 Ibid., 4. 
90 Ibid., 4–7. 
91 Ibid., 7. 
92 National Policing Improvement Agency (NPIA), Guidance on Multi-Agency Interoperability  
(United Kingdom: NPIA, 2009), Foreword. 
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response and recovery phases.93  Most recently, in February 2013, the Joint Emergency 
Services Interoperability Programme (JESIP) was established to address many of the UK 
events which led to the Project Definition Document. The aim of JESIP was to ensure 
that the “Blue Light” services are trained and exercised to work together as effectively as 
possible at all levels of command in response to major or complex incidents (including 
fast moving terrorist scenarios) so that as many lives as possible can be saved.”94  These 
UK documents set out national guidance for responding to a marauding terrorist firearms 
attack and set out at a strategic level, the common vision of the challenges, the roles and 
responsibilities and priority tasks for the emergency services. It provides overarching 
strategic objectives and generic priority tasks have been developed for responding to a 
MTFA that assist with the planning and implementation of the functional roles and 
responsibilities of the Blue Light services. These documents provides guidance on basic 
joint operating principles; the identification, mobilization and scene assessment; casualty 
management; and fire hazards management.   
Joint Operating Principles provide the basis for requiring command 
representatives from each of the emergency services to provide a timely, rapid and 
streamlined decision-making process, appropriate level of command support at the scene, 
identification and deployment of trained personnel for key command and support 
functions, and flexibility to apply these principles to the variations of regional and local 
operational guidelines. These principles acknowledge the difficulty in supporting a 
MTFA and basic premise that emergency service personnel may have to operate in 
locations that have not been declared completely safe. These principles are intended to 
reflect the progression of the joint emergency response from the onset to the conclusion 
of the incident.   
The UK policy allows armed officers to escort fire and ambulance personnel into 
the warm zone; however this practice cannot be guaranteed and must be determined 
during the joint risk assessment process. The deployment of specialized fire and rescue 
93 HM Government, Emergency Response and Recovery—Non-Statutory Guidance to Complement 
Emergency Preparedness. (London: HM Government, 2005), 4. 
94 JESIP, JESIP–Programme Definition Document, 5. 
 30 
                                                 
and ambulance service personnel into the warm zones is not dependent on the presence/
availability of armed officers to provide an escort or cover. Contingency plans must be 
developed to provide for a response without armed police officers and the use of non-
specialized emergency service personnel should be deployed as soon as the threat has 
been neutralized. Casualty Management provides the operational guidance for the 
management of casualties by specialized emergency service personnel equipped with 
appropriate PPE and specialized training for deployment into the warm zone. These 
incidents provide the unique nature of having a potential active threat present while 
patient care and removal is taking place.   
The recommendations for response to an active shooter or MTFA in the UK differ 
from the U.S. in that the policies and procedures are being set forth on a national level to 
all three Blue Light services.95 While not prescriptive, the two guiding documents 
described above provide an overarching framework for a standardized approach across 
the UK and not left to independent services to formulate these overarching goals. These 
strategic and operational plans act as guidance to resilience planners and emergency 
responders in the development and implementation of local response plans that are 
consistent with the national approach and interpretation of risk.96  While the fundamental 
principle of guidance is based upon maximizing the safety of the emergency responders, 
these national documents do not replace existing major incident procedures or local 
emergency response plans, but are meant to provide guidance on the particular challenges 
that these types of events pose. As police, fire and EMS agencies throughout the United 
States respond to these hostile events, it will be national guidance that allows the 
agencies within the U.S. to remain consistent in policy development and training and 
allow organizations to receive national funding to implement these new procedures. 
95 Ibid., 6–7. 
96 Ibid., 4 
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D. CONSIDERATIONS FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF A CROSS-
DISCIPLINARY TACTICAL RESPONSE POLICY 
1. Overview 
Complex hostile incidents require public safety agencies to employ non-
traditional policies, training and response procedures. This means that police, fire and 
EMS agencies must develop methodologies for integrating a unified, cooperative 
response model due to the unique nature of such incidents. Historically, police, fire and 
EMS personnel have performed their roles independently on incident scenes, and have 
also competed against one another for budget dollars and recognition for incident 
mitigation.97 To be effective in the new world of terrorism, especially against 
homegrown domestic terrorism, a cultural shift toward a more unified response must 
occur. The development of a unified and cross-disciplinary response requires many 
considerations to include the benefit of assuming increased risk, the establishment and 
compliance with unified structure for response, the determination of program support by 
the agency and/or locality, and the development of joint polices and integrated response 
frameworks. 
The Metropolitan Washington COG identified a service gap between law 
enforcement and Fire/EMS in the management of victims of mass casualty incidents 
during law enforcement response.98  While these events may seem infrequent, the USFA 
identified, since the Columbine High School shootings in 1999, more than 250 people 
have been killed in the United States during what has been classified as active shooter 
and mass casualty incidents.99  The service gap identified by COG occurs because the 
current operational norm is to prohibit fire and EMS access to incident scenes and victims 
until law enforcement can control, clear, and verify there is no threat to fire and EMS 
responders. To close response gaps, a cross-disciplinary tactical response policy must be 
97 Tracy L. Frazzano and Matthew G. Snyder,  “A Paradigm Shift for First Responders: Preparing the 
Emergency Response Community for Hybrid Targeted Violence,” The Police Chief, May 2013, 36. 
98 Washington Metropolitan Council of Governments, “Law Enforcement Integration with NCR EMS: 
A Review of Tactical Medical Programs in the NCR” (unpublished manuscript). 
99 United States Fire Administration,  Fire/Emergency Medical Services Department Operational 
Considerations, 3. 
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implemented to provide law enforcement, fire and EMS agencies with a response 
framework which includes commonly understood tactics, communication capabilities and 
terminology.   Achieving the goal of planning, preparing an appropriate response will 
provide victims with the best chance of survival and save the maximum number of 
lives.100 
2. Risk versus Benefit 
To keep pace with the shifting paradigm of hostile event response and mitigate 
risk to the first responders, changes to the response framework have included the 
development of action guides and policies for establishing cross-disciplinary teams, 
providing responding personnel guidelines to follow during initial response, direction for 
establishing unified incident command and identifying operational actions designed to 
integrate police and fire efforts for establishing a common IAP.101 According to a report 
by the Metropolitan Washington COG, determining risk vs. benefit of an integrated 
program is the first step in determining the level of interest from senior police, fire and 
EMS management, followed by the development of an action guide or response policy 
that implements cross-disciplinary teams.102  The question for jurisdictions may be: what 
level of risk are they willing to assume for their personnel? COG makes it clear that 
providing a policy is not the final piece to establishing effective integration. The council 
also claimed that successful implementation includes determining the level of police and 
fire integration required, identifying personnel involvement, training requirements, 
associated start-up and ongoing costs, sustainability, and any potential collective 
bargaining costs.103   
United States Fire Administrator Ernest Mitchell, Jr., and his administration, 
under the authority of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), released the 
100 Ibid. 
101 Fairfax County Fire and Rescue Department and Fairfax County Police Department, Joint Event 
Action Guide,. 2–5.  
102 Washington Metropolitan Council of Governments, “Law Enforcement Integration with NCR 
EMS: A Review of Tactical Medical Programs in the NCR” (unpublished manuscript). 
103 Ibid. 
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Fire/Emergency Medical Services Department Operational Considerations and Guide for 
Active Shooter and Mass Casualty Incidents in September 2013. These guidelines 
recommend exposing fire and EMS personnel to higher risk levels on active shooter and 
other hostile events than they previously encountered by waiting in staging. It 
recommends first responders equipped with body armor and escorted by armed police 
officers be sent into “warm zones” to focus on stopping victims’ bleeding.104   
While these new federal guidelines have been embraced by state and local 
officials, and the International Association of Firefighters (IAFF), they have raised 
questions that terrorists may target first responders as has already happened in places 
such as Iraq.105  Beginning early in a fire and EMS training program, scene safety is 
ingrained in the culture of fire and EMS personnel.   Authors Smith and Delaney in “A 
New Response” cite that some disagree with exposing fire and EMS to more risk to assist 
injured victims and that allowing fire and EMS personnel to operate in the warm zone is 
unsafe arguing that, “operating in an unsecured environment is too much risk for the 
responders to assume” and “scene safety” is paramount above all other considerations.106  
Smith and Delaney recognize that in an active shooter incident, the greatest threat to first 
responders is the shooter. The fact that the shooter is rapidly incapacitated in almost all 
incidents prior to police, fire and EMS response, makes the true risk of operating in warm 
zones or areas of indirect threat relatively low, thus diluting the critic’s argument.107  
Furthermore, Fire and EMS professionals accept risk each day as an inherent part of their 
job when responding to any type of emergency; a paradigm shift must occur to accept the 
same, if not lesser level of risk on active shooter incidents. In a more than 33-year study 
of active shooter incidents, only four incidents were documented where first responders 
were killed or injured.108  In all four cases, first responders were actively engaging the 
104 Michael S. Schmidt, “In Mass Attacks, New Advice Lets Medics Rush in,” New York Times, 
December 7, 2013. 
105 Ibid. 
106 E. Reed Smith Jr. and John B. Delaney. “A New Response-Supporting Paradigm Change in EMS’ 




                                                 
threat and pursuing the shooter(s), not treating victims in warm zones as recommended in 
the USFA guide.   
Critics that cite “scene safety” as paramount in any operation, often refer to a 
delayed ambush on first responders with second or multiple attacker(s) waiting to 
specifically target the fire and EMS responders after the initial police teams have moved 
into position.109  This risk remains extremely low as there are only two documented cases 
in the United States where there was more than one shooter: the attack on Westside 
Middle School in Jonesboro, Arkansas, and the Columbine incident. Neither of these 
involved an attack on first responders.110  The psychology of these gunmen will point to 
the fact that lying in wait to kill first responders while actively being hunted by police 
goes against their goal of killing or injuring as many people as possible, therefore it’s 
highly unlikely active shooter events will unfold with secondary attacks on first 
responders.111 While no incident is without risk, history has provided lessons to engage 
the future, demonstrating that with the implementation of established unified response 
guidelines, a cross-disciplinary response, proper ballistic equipment and training, any 
increase in risk can be properly mitigated.   
3. Unified Structure 
The U.S. government has provided public safety responders with a national 
unified operating structure for incident management to include the National Response 
Framework (NRF), which focuses fire and law enforcement efforts on compliance with 
the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and Incident Command Systems 
(ICS), and establishes the Unified Command (UC) Structure.112 NIMS “provides a 
systematic, proactive approach to guide departments and agencies at all levels of 
government, on governmental organizations, and the private sector to work seamlessly to 
prevent, protect against, respond to, recover from, and mitigate the effects of incidents, 
109 Ibid. 
110 Ibid. 
111 Ibid.  
112 U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), National Response Framework (Washington, DC: 
DHS, 2008), 48. 
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regardless of cause, size, location, or complexity, in order to reduce the loss of life and 
property and harm to the environment.”113  ICS is a standardized, on-scene, all-hazards 
incident management approach that was developed in the wildland firefighting arena 
where firefighters were facing an adversary that does not change tactics nor invent new 
weapons like those encountered by military and law enforcement.114 ICS and UC are 
components of the command–and-management portion of NIMS; however, NIMS and 
ICS are less successful in law enforcement events.115   
While effective on most standardized incidents, and especially effective on fire 
incidents, it has been suggested that NRF, to include the components of NIMS and ICS, 
does not establish itself well as a tool for managing chaos during highly intense, highly 
complex and low familiarity events because it does not provide clear instruction 
regarding integration of fire, EMS and police, thus failing to eliminate initial confusion 
and redundant activities.116  Utilizing past historical incidents such as shootings at 
Columbine High School, Virginia Tech, Mumbai, India, and the Aurora Movie Theatre, 
police, fire and EMS professionals have identified the need for unified response policies, 
inter-agency cooperation among disciplines, and the use of cross-disciplinary response 
procedures.   
4. Program Support 
Another consideration for the implementation of a cross-disciplinary response 
policy is the determination of program support. The Metropolitan Washington COG 
identifies that support must be achieved from all stakeholders to include senior and mid-
level leadership, risk managers, city/county attorneys, human resources personnel, 
113 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Incident Management System (Washington, DC: 
DHS, 2008), 1. 
114 Theodore J. Moody, “Filling the Gap between NIMS/ICS and the Law Enforcement Initial 
Response in the Age of the Urban Jihad” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2010), 7 
115 Ibid.  
116 Ibid., 12. 
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medical directors and associated medical facilities, and representatives from unions with 
or without collective bargaining powers.117  
COG concludes that senior management must decide: 
• Is the program warranted and will it receive the necessary support and 
buy-in? 
• Is the program reasonable given the fiscal constraints and state of the 
economy? 
• What are the risks and benefits to those personnel involved in the 
program? 
• Are the goals and mission of the program attainable and most importantly 
sustainable?  
• Can a change of culture be established? 
• How will implemented procedures and program be validated? 
• What is the risk to public safety personnel and the community of not 
providing the service?118 
Ultimately, the most important question to be answered may be what is the risk to 
the community of not providing an integrated program to include a cross-disciplinary 
response? 
5. Policy Development 
Consideration must be provided to maintaining interoperability within the broader 
region to ensure awareness and compatibility during incidents requiring mutual aid 
response. The overall future goal of any integrated response system should be to plan, 
prepare and respond in a manner that will save the maximum number of lives possible 
through the implementation of a regional response plan to include establishing common 
tactics, communications, capabilities and terminology, and SOPs.119  The success of 
117 Washington Metropolitan Council of Governments, “Law Enforcement Integration with NCR 
EMS: A Review of Tactical Medical Programs in the NCR” (unpublished manuscript). 
118 Ibid., 14–17 
119 United States Fire Administration, Fire/Emergency Medical Services Department, Operational 
Considerations, 3. 
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active shooter and other hostile incidents requiring joint police, fire and EMS interaction 
is the implementation of effective command and control procedures that are built upon 
coordination, communication and information sharing that is provided in a unified and 
integrated response policy. 
In April 2013, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI), in cooperation with the International Association of Fire 
Chiefs (IAFC) and the International Chiefs of Police, convened a meeting to address 
“Responding to Mass Shootings—Strengthening Fire/Law Enforcement/EMS 
Partnerships.”120  Together with the IAFF and the Fraternal Order of Police, this group of 
associations and federal entities developed recommendations and position statements to 
address the need for organizations to work together when confronting an active shooter 
situation. In response to this meeting, the IAFF issued two position statements, Active 
Shooter Events and Rescue Task Force Training, providing a template for discussing 
appropriate actions and safety considerations during SOP development.   
The IAFF Position Statement on Active Shooter Events recommends that SOP’s 
should include at a minimum:   
• Use of NIMS in particular the Incident Command System. In accordance 
with NIMS and ICS, fire and police should establish a single command 
post and establish unified command. 
• Use of nationally accepted standards and operational protocols including 
the number and type of response personnel, training level, PPE, 
operational environment, and scope of practice. 
• Use of RTF concept for on-scene response. 
• Provide appropriate protective gear to personnel exposed to risks. 
• Police and fire departments should train together, to include initial and 
ongoing training. 
120  “IAFF Position Statement: Active Shooter Events.”  
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• Use of common communications terminology.121 
The IAFF Position Statement on Rescue Task Force (RTF) training provides that 
initial and ongoing training for all EMS providers should include TECC concepts and 
practical skill applications.122  The IAFF’s position directs that indirect threat care should 
be rendered once the casualty is no longer under fire in areas such as the warm zone.123 
The USFA’s Fire/Emergency Medical Services Department Operational 
Considerations and Guide for Active Shooter and Mass Casualty Incidents suggests 
operating principles designed to achieve desired success in active shooter and mass 
casualty incidents by implementing prepared leadership, planning, communications, 
training and competent execution of tactical operations.124  These general operational 
principles include:  
• ICS:  Implementation and utilization of ICS as the command and control 
system which provides an organizational structure for incident 
management and assists in planning, building and adapting that structure 
to the incident. ICS is not only applicable across disciplines of fire, police 
and EMS, but is used by all levels of government and by many 
nongovernmental organizations and the private sector.  
• UC:  Although active shooter events involve the disciplines of police, fire 
and EMS, the primary responsibility for mitigation is with the law 
enforcement agencies. UC provides for integration of the command and 
control efforts among all three agencies as well as nongovernmental 
organizations and the private sector.  
• Plan for Treatment of Causalities:  Development of a plan for the 
treatment of causalities to include when and where they will be treated, 
and how they will be evacuated from the impact area. Completion of 
critical actions must be assigned to responding agencies and members of 
cross-disciplinary teams to reduce duplication of efforts and assign 
accountability for task completion. As part of casualty treatment plan, 
responders must incorporate medical guidelines that allow for medical 
121 “IAFF Position Statement: Rescue Task Force Training, “ International Association of Fire 




124 United States Fire Administration, Fire/Emergency Medical Services Department Operational 
Considerations, 7. 
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operations in high-risk conditions, prioritizes, and focuses medical efforts 
on victim survivability.   
• News Media/Public Information Officer:  A Public Information Officer 
(PIO) and Joint Information System (JIS) should be established to provide 
for the consolidation of all agency and incident information. Numerous 
responding public and private agencies will desire accurate and timely 
information. The PIO must develop a plan for release of media 
announcements and support of families and co-workers of any casualties. 
• EOP:  The development of an Emergency Operations Plan (EOP) provides 
the framework for command and control of active shooter and other 
hostile events requiring cross-disciplinary team response and integration 
of multiple agencies.125 
This written EOP which includes the multi-agency, multi-disciplinary nature of the 
incident should also include the following considerations: 
1. Command, control and communications procedures to include common 
terminology. 
2. Establishment of a single Incident Command Post (ICP) and use of UC. 
3. Fire, police and EMS’ overarching strategy and tactics 
4. Requirement for discipline and integrated training regarding the plan. 
5. Direction of a coordinated public messaging process. 
6. Suggested aviation considerations and the potential advanced location of 
staging areas, rally points, Casualty Collection Point’s (CCP) and the ICP. 
7. Consideration of potential target hazards and the establishment of support 
areas, such as family assistance areas. 
8. Procedures for obtaining additional support and resources from external 
resources. 
9. Review, endorsement and support of the community. 
10. A plan to review, exercise and update the EOP on a regular basis. 
Exercises associated with the EOP should follow the U. S. Department of 
125 Ibid., 7–12 
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Homeland Security’s Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation 
Program (HSEEP).126 
The environment for first responders is changing, requiring first responders to 
match resources to the environment. The development and implementation of a cross-
disciplinary response policy to active shooter and other hostile events is a new paradigm 
and change in culture for police, fire and EMS personnel.   It will be the aforementioned 
considerations and the procedures set forth in these policies that will provide casualties 
with the best chance of survival through immediate lifesaving care by first responders. 
  
126 Ibid., 10–15 
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III. LITERATURE RELATED TO CROSS-DISCIPLINARY 
TEAMS 
Cross-disciplinary teams of emergency responders have not been commonplace in 
the public safety agencies of police, fire and EMS in the United States. What has been 
common practice is individual agencies arriving on the scene and managing their area of 
expertise, with personnel rarely operating together in a combined tactical manner. This 
chapter addresses relevant literature to development and use of cross-disciplinary teams 
to include the factors that contribute to the success of these teams as well as the enablers 
and barriers to team effectiveness. Accompanying literature was also reviewed on the 
effects of identifying and merging the varying disciplines of police, fire and EMS as well 
as the methods to successfully integrate them.   
A. CROSS-DISCIPLINARY TEAMS 
Specialized teams within public safety agencies have become commonplace with 
the development and response of Hazardous Materials and Technical Rescue Response 
teams, Water Rescue teams, SWAT teams, Search and Recovery teams, and Explosive 
Ordinance Disposal (EOD) teams. While these are only limited examples, many of these 
specialized teams use personnel from a single agency or discipline to staff and respond to 
an event. As defined by Salas, Rosen, Burke and Goodwin, a team is defined as a set of 
two or more individuals that adaptively and dynamically interacts through specialized 
roles as they work toward shared and valued goals.127  Teams allow us to integrate the 
diverse expertise of its members and participating agencies to accomplish complex, 
uncertain work that is difficult to plan, structure, and sub-divide in advance.128  While 
teams can exist to fulfill some purpose such as product development, providing a service, 
127 Eduardo Salas et al., “The Wisdom of Collectives in Organizations: An Update of the Teamwork 
Competencies,” in Team Effectiveness in Complex Organizations—Cross-Disciplinary Perspectives and 
Approaches, eds. Eduardo Salas, Gerald F. Goodwin and C. Shawn Burke (New York: Taylor & Francis 
Group, 2009), 40 
128 Amy C. Edmondson and Kathryn S. Roloff, “Overcoming Barriers to Collaboration: Psychology 
Safety and Learning in Diverse Teams,” in Team Effectiveness in Complex Organizations—Cross-
Disciplinary Perspectives and Approaches, eds. Eduardo Salas, Gerald F. Goodwin and C. Shawn Burke 
(New York: Taylor & Francis Group, 2009), 185.  
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or making an important decision, research provided by McShane and Glinow suggests 
that team members are held together by their interdependence and need for collaboration 
to achieve common goals.129   
The use of teams in an active shooter environment requires the coordinated effort 
of multiple disciplines and functions for successful mitigation of the event. The 
Columbine High School shootings provide us evidence that no single agency or discipline 
can handle an event of that nature and magnitude. What sets Columbine apart from other 
combined responses of police, fire, and EMS, is that this terrorist style attack combines 
the need for rapid entry and medical treatment by fire and EMS personnel with the 
ongoing law enforcement “active shooter” and EOD response. In Columbine, first 
responders had to handle nearly 100 improvised incendiary and explosive devices, many 
of which were intended to harm first responders.130  Events of this magnitude require a 
rapid, coordinated and combined response to be able to eliminate the threat (shooter) 
while simultaneously accessing, providing rapid assessment and treatment to the victims, 
and removing them to areas of safety and advanced medical care. It has become apparent 
that no single individual or job function can maintain the sufficient knowledge, skills, 
training and responsibility needed to operate within this complex environment. What is 
needed is a team with a high level of expertise that combines the various levels of 
specialized skill into one cohesive group working toward a common goal, which has 
become known as cross-disciplinary or cross-functional teams.131  For the purpose of this 
research, the term cross-disciplinary team will be used synonymously with the term 
cross-functional team. 
This chapter provides a review of the literature that is relevant to the development 
of cross-disciplinary teams. It begins with identifying the contributing factors that 
provide for the success of cross-disciplinary teams and how the various components of 
these structured teams can enhance the operational effectiveness during hostile or active 
129 Steven L. McShane and Mary Ann Young Glinow, Organizational Behavior Essentials (New 
York: McGraw-Hill, 2007), 363. 
130 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Wanton Violence at Columbine High School. 
.(Emmitsburg, MD: United States Fire Administration, April 1999), 1 
131 Edmondson and Roloff, “Overcoming Barriers to Collaboration,” 196. 
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shooter events. With the implementation of cross-disciplinary teams, barriers and 
challenges have been identified that must be taken into consideration to achieve the 
desired results that are expected with a unified team. These challenges include the impact 
of individual organizational cultures when attempting to implement a unified cross-
disciplinary team process. This chapter will review the importance of culture 
identification and the need to transform each individual public safety culture into a 
unified cross-disciplinary culture to provide for operational team effectiveness.   
Cross-disciplinary teams are usually associated with corporate product 
development, transforming organizations, increasing speed to market and innovative 
design, but they can be vitally important to the success of combined hostile events due to 
the complex nature of the tasks to be accomplished and need for response personnel with 
specialized training and capabilities.132 These tasks can include neutralization of the 
shooter(s), EOD and WMD response, investigation of the crime scene, fire suppression, 
triage and treatment of victims, extraction of victims from impact area, and transportation 
to a medical facility. Literature concludes that the essence and desire of effective cross-
disciplinary teamwork is to create a response through a collective effort that exceeds the 
quality of any single specialized team effort.133 The diversity of expertise on a cross-
disciplinary team creates the potential for teams to complete work outside of the scope of 
any one individual’s capability.134   
Salas et al. found that effective teams have members with the knowledge, skills, 
attitudes, and other characteristics (KSAOs) to accomplish both individual task 
performance and necessary teams.135  Team members must possess not only their 
132 Josh Daspit et al., “Cross-Functional Team Effectiveness—an Examination of Internal Team 
Environment, Shared Leadership, and Cohesion Influences,” Team Performance Management 19 (2013): 
35.  
133 Kim L. Smart and Carol Barnum, “Communication in Cross-Functional Teams: An Introduction to 
this Special Issue,” Technical Communication 47, no. 1 (February 2000): 19. 
134 Salas et al., The Wisdom of Collectives in Organizations: An Update of the Teamwork 
Competencies, 40–41. 
135 Ibid., 41. 
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individual-level expertise relevant to the technical position they serve on the team, but 
also expertise in the social dynamics of teamwork.136   
Cross-disciplinary teams bring a variety of benefits such as the collaborative 
effort of combining qualified, high-level information and training brought by each team 
member. They also bring benefits such as: 
• Enhanced communication and decision making through rich sharing of 
information. 
• Increased productivity with higher levels of involvement, commitment, 
motivation, and subsequent accountability among workers. 
• Improved processes, building on diverse backgrounds and experiences. 
• Distributed workloads (responding to situations where problems and tasks 
become too large for one individual or agency).137 
Dr. Ben Carson, former director of Pediatric Neurosurgery at John’s Hopkins 
Hospital in Baltimore, Maryland, saw a growth in cross-disciplinary teams in the 
healthcare industry to help resolve complex social, economic, and environmental 
problems.138  Because of the explosion in complex medical knowledge, no one person 
can know it all and cross-disciplinary teams take advantage of cutting-edge knowledge 
and technology.139  Carson cites people skills as the main skill necessary to be able to 
merge the multiple personalities and egos and make each team member get the 
appropriate recognition and feel inclusive in the process of achieving the team’s goals. 
Defining the team goals and identifying the best way to accomplish the tasks at hand are 
vitally important to the success of the team. According to Carson, the most common 
mistake when team building is putting the wrong people on the team especially in terms 
of team member compatibility. The identification and blending of cultures of the specific 
team member’s agency is an important factor for consideration and will be examined in 
the next section.   
136 Ibid., 41. 
137 Smart and Barnum, “Communication in Cross-Functional Teams,” 19. 
138 Kristin Clarke, “Team Building Under Pressure,” Associations Now 5, no. 7 (2009): 19. 
139 Ibid.  
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1. Factors Contributing to Success of Cross-Disciplinary Teams 
Research has investigated the relationship between success and specific 
characteristics associated with cross-disciplinary teams. McDonough utilized 
questionnaires mailed to 776 users of cross-disciplinary teams in product development 
that included a range of industries, including consumer goods, services, and business; 112 
responses were analyzed. The goal was to determine which factors are more frequently 
mentioned as leading to project/process success.140  McDonough found that cross-
disciplinary teams are widely used with 97% of the responses having used them, and 33% 
used them 100% of the time. When analyzing the reason why firms implemented a cross-
disciplinary team approach, speed was most frequently provided as the performance 
reason.141    
McDonough identified three major findings to include stage-setting elements, 
enablers, and team behaviors.142  Stage-Setting Elements reflect initial management 
actions that direct the development of team processes. These include setting project goals, 
empowering team members, establishing a team climate and the assigning of human 
resources to the team. These elements create clarity of direction for the team, provides 
team members with the decision-making authority, create a climate enveloping the team’s 
efforts, and selecting members who will enhance the likelihood of success.143  
McDonough proposes that stage-setting elements operate on project outcomes indirectly 
by affecting the behavior of the team, which in turn influences project (process) 
performance. Enablers are individuals, team leaders, managers and champions that can 
facilitate the team’s efforts and impact the stage-setting elements. Champions are defined 
as people who take a strong interest in seeing a particular process advance or product 
developed. They can represent various hierarchical levels within the organization but are 
140 Edward F. McDonough, “Investigation of Factors Contributing to the Success of Cross-Functional 
Teams,” Journal of Product Innovation Management 17, no. 3 (2000), 232. 
141 McDonough, “Investigation of Factors Contributing to the Success of Cross-Functional Teams,” 
230. 
142 Ibid., 223. 
143 Ibid., 223–224. 
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in a position to play an enabling role towards the success of the team.144  Enabler’s 
influence project (process) performance principally by influencing team behaviors rather 
than by having a direct impact on project outcomes. Enablers influence team behaviors 
by moderating the effects of the different stage-setting elements. The team behaviors of 
cooperation, commitment, ownership, and mutual respect can have an effect on the 
successful outcome of cross-disciplinary teams.145  McDonough recognizes that 
managers are responsible for both establishing stage-setting elements engaging in 
behaviors that can significantly influence the behaviors exhibited by the team.146 
In McDonough’s research on cross-disciplinary team success, three important 
elements were frequently mentioned: 1) the establishment of clear and unchanging goals, 
2) team leadership, and 3) team cooperation.147  These three reasons align with the 
different categories (stage-setting elements, enablers, and team behaviors), suggesting 
that achieving team success may involve intricate relationships among organizational 
factors (goals), support from outside the team (such as leadership), as well as within team 
dynamics.148   
2. Enhancing Team Effectiveness 
Salas et al., define team effectiveness as an evaluation of the outcomes of team 
performance processes relative to some set of criteria.149  These criteria can include how 
the team affects the organization, individual team members, and the team’s capabilities 
for the future.150  The effectiveness relates to how well the results of the team 
performance met some set of relatively objective (e.g., metrics of productivity) or 
subjective (e.g., supervisor or observer ratings) standards which should be aligned with 
144 Ibid., 225. 
145 Ibid., 226–227. 
146 Ibid., 233. 
147 Ibid., 231. 
148 Ibid., 231–232. 
149 Salas et al., “The Wisdom of Collectives in Organizations,” 41. 
150 McShane and Glinow, Organizational Behavior Essentials, 363. 
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the goals of the team and the participating organizations.151 It is important to understand 
the elements of an effective team if we want to implement them successfully and reduce 
the chance of team failure.   
McShane and Glinow reviewed the literature on team effectiveness and provide 
an integrative model. This model (see Figure 1) shows three categories of factors that 
impact team effectiveness, organizational and team environment, team design, and team 
process.152  There are six organizational and team environment factors that can affect the 
team’s design, processes and outcomes. These include reward systems, communication 
systems, physical space, organizational environment and organizational structure.153   
 
 
Figure 1.  Team Effectiveness Model154 
 
151 Salas et al., “The Wisdom of Collectives in Organizations,” 41. 
152 McShane and Glinow, Organizational Behavior Essentials, 135–136. 
153 Ibid. 
154 Ibid., 135–136. 
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When looking at designing an effective team, the three main elements of task 
characteristics, team size and team composition should be considered.155  Teamwork can 
sometimes be well structured, sometimes it can be complex, and sometimes there is task 
uncertainty, however the need for teamwork increases with task interdependence.156  The 
point is that the team needs to be designed (choice of participants, their skill sets, their 
responsibilities and authorities...) based on those task characteristics. Task 
interdependence is defined by McShane and Glinow as the degree to which a task 
requires employees to share common inputs or outcomes, or to interact in the process of 
executing their work. The higher level of task interdependence, the greater the need for 
the team rather than individuals working alone. A key decision is the size of the team. 
Teams should be large enough to provide the necessary competencies and perspectives to 
perform the work, they found, yet small enough to maintain efficient coordination and 
meaningful involvement of each member. The authors also concluded that while 
technical skills and knowledge are important to a homogenous team, team members must 
fit into the team environment. The third set of team effectiveness elements known as 
team processes include team development, norms, roles and cohesiveness.157  Teams 
must pass through several stages during development before they emerge as an effective 
unit and they develop norms which are the informal rules and expectations that regulate 
the behavior of its members.158  As team members develop strong ties of social identity 
to the group, the greater motivation that they will have to perform well and avoid any 
negative cogitation. Team members have roles that are behaviors necessary to perform, to 
coordinate the team’s tasks and achieve the goals of the team and the organization.159 
Team cohesiveness is defined as the degree of attraction people feel toward the team and 
their motivation to remain members. Cohesion tends to increase when teams are of 
smaller size yet large enough to capture the diverse skills and perspectives required to 
obtain the teams goals when they interact regularly, when entry to the team is somewhat 
155 Ibid., 137. 
156 Ibid., 150. 
157 Ibid.. 138. 
158 Ibid., 139–140. 
159 Ibid., 141. 
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restricted and provides an elite status, with team success, and when members face 
external competition or a challenging objective is valued.    
3. Barriers and Challenges for Cross-Disciplinary Teams 
The literature on cross-disciplinary teams points out a positive impact on 
organizational performance and a “cure” for companies, producing more creative 
thinking and innovation.160 However, teams also face specific challenges and barriers to 
success. These barriers and challenges include diversity, multiple reporting relationships, 
lack of trust, non-supportive leadership, and interpersonal conflict.161 
Diversity differences can also include member personality, culture, language or 
jargon, as well as organizational responsibilities, reward systems and physical barriers.162  
These potential barriers support the need for team members to work collaboratively and 
the importance of internal team characteristics and cohesiveness in order to realize the 
full potential of the team’s diversity. The specialized expertise of the team members and 
the variation in knowledge and perspectives has the potential to create communication 
barriers and conflict among members.163   
Cross-disciplinary team members can experience pressure, conflict and 
communication problems by maintaining multiple reporting relationships.164  The issue is 
that it may be difficult for team members to coordinate when they have different 
reporting chains for the functions they represent as well a reporting requirement within 
the team structure. 
Team trust is a critical element of cross-disciplinary teams that has a positive 
impact on team processes and results in increased performance.165 A literature review 
conducted by Webber found that the high abilities, diverse skills and knowledge can lead 
160 Sheila Simsarian Webber, “Leadership and Trust Facilitating Cross-Functional Team Success,” 
Journal of Professional Development 21, no. 3 (2002): 201. 
161 Ibid., 202–205. 
162 Ibid., 202–203. 
163 Daspit et al., “Cross-Functional Team Effectiveness,” 35.  
164 Webber, “Leadership and Trust Facilitating Cross-Functional Team Success,” 204. 
165 Ibid., 207. 
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to trusting relationships and successful performance.166  However, “value differences 
stemming from functional diversity, time allocation heterogeneity and differences in 
reporting requirements result in lower trust within the team,” which can also occur when 
an individual or group is perceived as not sharing key cultural values.167  Organizations 
must develop a team climate for enhancing trust among the team members to provide an 
effective team and improve team performance. Salas et al. provides that a lack of team 
trust can lead to wasting time and resources checking on other’s performance, degree of 
team member’s contributions, outcome quality and retention of members.168  
Leadership can influence a climate for team trust prior to, and at the beginning of 
the formation of cross-disciplinary teams. Effective actions taken prior to team formation 
can include gaining top management support, selecting high ability team members, 
selecting team members who are all on the same organizational level, and possibly those 
who have worked together in the past and have worked with the various leaders in the 
past.169  During team formation, leadership can: negotiate expectations with discipline 
team leaders, build positive relationships with other team leaders, promote a shared 
commitment for the process, and develop and articulate a clear mission for the team.170   
Cross-disciplinary teams create the opportunity for team members to act as a 
spokesperson for their individual discipline. This can result in reduced flexibility and the 
potential for conflict if the team’s learning goal is replaced with a political agenda and 
egos associated with their discipline identity.171  Team effectiveness can be challenged 
by conflict among team members due to tension caused by real or perceived 
differences.172 In contrast, effective teams establish a positive, trusting group climate 
based upon interpersonal liking, and shared norms and values. De Dreu and Van Vianen 
166 Ibid., 204. 
167 Ibid. 
168 Salas et al., “The Wisdom of Collectives in Organizations,” 47. 
169 Webber, “Leadership and Trust Facilitating Cross-Functional Team Success,” 210. 
170 Ibid. 
171 Edmondson and Roloff, “Overcoming Barriers to Collaboration,” 196. 
172 Carsten K. W. De Dreu and Annelies E. M. Van Vianen, “Managing Relationship Conflict and the 
Effectiveness of Organizational Teams,” Journal of Organizational Behavior 22, no. 3 (May, 2001): 309.  
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contend that when teams manage conflicts through collaboration and not contending or 
avoiding, team effectiveness is enhanced.173  The importance of cooperative goals and 
collaboration cannot be over emphasized especially when speaking about task conflict. 
The research concludes that collaborating in task conflict situations increases individual 
and team effectiveness, as exemplified by greater satisfaction and feelings of self-efficacy 
among conflict parties, more mutually beneficial solutions, reduced likelihood of future 
conflict, and better goal achievement.174 Daniel Druckman and Kathleen Zechmeister 
indicated that conflict involving relationships cannot be resolved by joint compromise or 
concessions, but instead by understanding of the situation by one or both parties which 
can include avoiding or forestalling the issues causing the conflict.175  Avoiding the 
interpersonal issue may allow the conflict to subside as time passes and new experiences 
and assignments develop, which suggests that team functioning and team effectiveness 
will increase. When significant cultural differences are found within the group or team, 
individuals will often identify with their cultural sub-group rather than with the entire 
group.176  The importance of integrating the various disciplines’ cultures must be 
addressed to maintain the balance of cohesiveness of the team. Individual agencies, 
members, and leaders must maintain the understanding that team diversity may inhibit 
collaboration and take steps to mitigate these challenges.   
The barriers and challenges of diversity, multiple reporting relationships, lack of 
trust, non-supportive leadership, and interpersonal conflict, are items that if not identified 
and managed effectively, have the ability cause conflict and negatively impact team 
performance. Prior single agency operations may have not provided the opportunity for 
these barriers and challenges to surface, but once recognized, each agency must work 
with their own agency and that of others to provide the necessary steps to address them 
and provide a unified cross-disciplinary team approach.   
173 Ibid., 312. 
174 Ibid.  
175 Daniel Druckman and Kathleen Zechmeister, “Conflict of Interest and Value Dissensus 
Propositions in the Sociology of Conflict,” Human Relations 26, no. 4 (1973): 449–466, quoted in De Dreu 
and Van Vianen, “Managing Relationship Conflict,” 313. 
176 Edmondson and Roloff, “Overcoming Barriers to Collaboration,” 196. 
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B. CULTURE CHANGE 
1. Changing Culture in Public Safety 
While much literature on culture change deals directly with successful or 
unsuccessful mergers of organizations, the implementation of a multi-agency cross-
disciplinary team can be compared to the merger of police, fire and EMS disciplines each 
with separate cultures and the expectation to transform into one public safety culture 
through a combined approach.177 The intention is to combine the successful attributes of 
law enforcement, fire and EMS into a combined synergistic operating platform for the 
benefit of saving lives through decreased response times of the medical providers and 
transport times for the victims. This combined operating platform is forcing each agency 
to operate within a changed environment, altering their individual agencies response 
methodologies by the utilization of a cross-disciplinary team approach and changing their 
respective cultures. This team approach is contrary to police work which is more 
individualistic in nature and in comparison to fire culture which is more group-
oriented.178  The implementation of a cross-disciplinary team approach to handle these 
types of events can be a dramatic change in an organizations culture, comparing it to the 
downsizing, restructuring, reorganization or merger of various organizations and public 
safety entities.179 While many of these decisions are based upon financial or strategic 
considerations, many organizations that attempt these changes often fail to meet the 
desired expectations of the intended transformation because they fail to realize and 
address the incompatibility of the various cultures.180  While the motive for any intended 
organizational change can be practical, psychological, or opportunist, the ultimate goal or 
any re-organization is to achieve synergy based upon the affected change.181   
177 Jeanne B. Stinchcomb and Francisco Ordaz. “The Integration of Two ‘Brotherhoods’ into One 
Organizational Culture: A Psycho-Social Perspective on Merging Police and Fire Services,” Public 
Organization Review 7, no. 2 (June 2007): 147. 
178 Ibid., 153. 
179 Ibid., 144, 147. 
180 Susan Cartwright and Cary L. Cooper, “The Role of Culture Compatibility in Successful 
Organizational Marriage,” Academy of Management Executive 7, no. 2 (May 1993): 57. 
181 Ibid. 
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The culture of an organization is the social identity that establishes the values, 
norms and behavioral expectations of the group, often described as the unwritten “rules 
of the game” or the “personality of the organization.182  It is characterized by the 
symbols, values, ideologies and assumptions which operate in an unconscious way to 
guide and fashion the organization and its individual employees.183  It defines what is 
acceptable and unacceptable in the organization and its work environment, and often is 
not readily apparent through outward appearance but imbedded deep into the 
organization and its employees. Inside an organization, sub units such as functional 
departments, sections and teams may possess their own unique cultures.184 Examples of 
teams and functional units can include SWAT, Hazardous Materials Response Teams, 
Urban Search and Rescue Task Forces, gang units and many others. The dimensions of 
organization culture operate deeply beneath the surface where they often go unnoticed, 
are taken for granted, and are often considered more powerful than the formal rules and 
regulations established by the organization in terms of guiding employee behaviors.185   
In police, fire and EMS agencies, many of these cultural norms define our respective 
work ethics and have history dated back to the development of the services.   
2. Success in Merging Cultures 
Susan Cartwright and Gary Cooper looked at the role of culture in successful 
organizational change, acknowledging that many cultures, particularly the strong ones are 
not meant to change. When an organization remains steady, that is not a problem, but 
when change is implemented and two cultures are forced to integrate, the result can be 
problematic.186 Cartwright and Cooper, who performed an analysis of 200 European 
182  Stinchcomb and Ordaz, “The Integration of Two ‘Brotherhoods’ into One Organizational 
Culture,” 145. 
183 Cartwright and Cooper, “The Role of Culture Compatibility in Successful Organizational 
Marriage,” 60. 
184 Kim S. Cameron and Robert E. Quinn, Diagnosing and Changing Organizational Culture (San 
Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 2006), 17. 
185 Stinchcomb and Ordaz. “The Integration of Two ‘Brotherhoods’ into One Organizational 
Culture,” 146. 
186 Cartwright and Cooper, “The Role of Culture Compatibility in Successful Organizational 
Marriage,” 60. 
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chief executives, found that cultural incompatibility is widely acknowledged as the 
reason for poor merger performance, which can lead to low morale, poor work quality, 
and declining performance.187 
In Cartwright and Cooper’s study of a range of business sectors in the United 
Kingdom over a three-year period, the relationship between combining organizations’ 
culture types and the post-merger or acquisition performance were analyzed. Utilizing 
over 170 formal interviews and over 700 questionnaires, the research was implemented to 
assess the types of culture that integrate well and whether some are more adaptable to 
change than others. Levels of organizational commitment, job satisfaction, employee 
stress, and mental well-being were analyzed at various points throughout the merger or 
acquisition. 
The research found that the existing pre-combination cultures of the partnering 
organizations played a major and fundamental role in determining merger and acquisition 
outcomes and any variation in performance was linked to the cultural dynamics of 
combining the organizations.188  These cultural dynamics included the complex 
interaction between the existing type of organizational culture of the partners, and the 
terms and interpretation of the type of contract or merger that the parties believed they 
had entered into.189  It was found that these variations in performance were potentially 
predictable and thus preventable. 
Roger Harrison, who first outlined his typology in a 1972 article in the Harvard 
Business Review, describes four types of organizational culture: power, role, task/
achievement and person/support, each with individual characteristics.190  While Harrison 
concluded that there is no one “best” culture for success, the different culture types create 
different psychological environments for their employees and play an important part in 
the expected performance of the agencies involved in any merger or re-design.191  The 
187 Ibid., 59. 
188 Ibid., 60–61. 
189 Ibid., 61. 
190 Ibid.  
191 Ibid. 
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individual characteristics of the four types of organizational culture must not only be 
acknowledged, but managed during the cross-disciplinary team implementation process.   
3. Culture Change for Mergers and Acquisition 
To assist with the transformation to a cross-disciplinary model, we must look at 
the practice of organizational mergers and acquisitions which are similar in the way 
cultures are affected. Merger or acquisition success is the ability to integrate or displace a 
culture and the combination of the various types of organizational culture. Cartwright and 
Cooper describe the outcome of the merger or “role” types of cultures which closely 
match public safety as potentially good with a “smooth assimilation likely as effectively 
rewriting or presenting a new rule book.”  Mergers and acquisitions must fall into one of 
three categories; Extension Merger, Collaborative Merger, and Redesign Merger.192   
• Extension: When the acquiring organization does not intend to change, 
other than perhaps minimally, business is conducted in a “hands-off” 
manner. 
• Collaborative: When the success is dependent upon the integration of 
operations or exchange of technology or other expertise. In genuine 
collaborative mergers, where partner equality is recognized, differences in 
organizational culture are seen as potentially adding value to the 
partnership. 
• Redesign: When the acquiring organization intends to introduce wide-
scale changes. The acquired, usually smaller, merger partner totally adopts 
the practices, procedures, and culture of the dominant merger partner. 
While difficulty in coordinating and integrating processes or organizational 
activities are often the result of culture clashes among different subunits, the success of 
the cross-disciplinary team concept can often be attributed to the integration of the 
various cultures, where the merger must be accepted by the members of the combining 
organizations.193  Cartwright and Cooper use the Acculturation Model to describe the 
process of contact, conflict, and adaption when two or more cultures come together. 
Acculturation reflects the process through which divergent cultures can become 
192 Ibid., 63. 
193 Cameron and Quinn, Diagnosing and Changing Organizational Culture, 17–18. 
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integrated.194  Acculturation occurs through four different modes depending on the 
member’s views of their satisfaction and value with their existing culture and their 
evaluation of the attractiveness of the other culture(s). The modes include Assimilation, 
Deculturation, Integration, and Separation.195  This model can be applied to the 
implementation of cross-disciplinary teams to accommodate the different cultural 
dynamics and outcomes of the merger. Assimilation occurs when members of the 
acquired organization willingly relinquish their existing culture, and adopt and become 
absorbed into the culture of the acquirer or dominant merger partner, they assimilate.196 
If this relinquishment of their existing culture is resisted by the members, separation can 
occur. Deculturation is when members of the acquired organization are dissatisfied with 
their existing culture, but unconvinced as to the attractiveness of the other culture, 
deculturation occurs.197 This can cause confusion and alienation among the members. 
Integration represents the interaction and adaptation between two cultures, which result 
in the evolvement of a new culture which represents the best of each culture.198 
Requiring a change and balance between the two cultural groups, this situation represents 
considerable potential for culture collisions and fragmentation.199  Separation occurs 
when members of the acquired organization resist any attempt to assimilate or adapt to 
the culture of the acquirer which is likely to result in culture collisions and a lack of 
cohesiveness.200  The model proposes four possible modes of acculturation which can 
influence the degree of success of merger and acquisition outcomes. The model describes 
the initial cultural relationship between the organizations which therefore has different 
implications on success. 
194 Stinchcomb and Ordaz, “The Integration of Two ‘Brotherhoods’ into One Organizational 
Culture,” 148. 








                                                 
4. Transformation into a Unified Cross-Disciplinary Culture 
While mergers and acquisitions are commonplace in today’s business world, they 
remain relatively unheard of in the public safety environment. In the analysis of a case 
study involving the merger between a large county sheriff’s office and the same county’s 
fire and rescue department in the southeastern United States, Stinchcomb and Ordaz 
concluded that government agencies in general are well-noted for ascribing reform to a 
need for change without ever clearly defining the need itself or specifying whose need is 
being served. This merger combined the two agencies under the unified command 
operations of the sheriff’s office. To assist in the establishment of cross-disciplinary 
teams and the desire of agencies to merge operational methodologies and procedures, the 
case study concluded that a qualitative analysis should be conducted to review each 
agency’s administrative and procedural documents as well as interviews with the agency 
members that are being tasked with implementing the new unified policy and 
methodology.201 These interviews serve to identify the potential enablers and barriers to 
cross-disciplinary team implementation which includes the merging of two or more 
individual cultures. Stinchcomb and Ordaz describe three major theoretical components 
that are relevant to this case study that when identified and managed, can assist in the 
transformation into a successful unified cross-disciplinary team culture. They include 
“the formation of work-related identity, the interactions between psychological needs and 
the organizational culture, and the reciprocal expectation between employees and their 
employers.”202 
• Work-related identity is developed through the employee’s associations 
with their co-workers, the nature of the work, their hierarchical status, the 
intrinsic and extrinsic rewards they receive, and the organizational culture 
to which they have adapted.203  To assist in a smooth implementation 
process, personnel charged with implementing these new response 
procedures and methodologies should meet with employees of each 
agency, through established meetings and orientation sessions set up 
especially to describe this new way of doing business. A mechanism for 
201 Stinchcomb and Ordaz, “The Integration of Two ‘Brotherhoods’ into One Organizational 
Culture,” 149. 
202 Ibid., 150. 
203 Ibid., 151. 
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two-way communication should be established to solicit feedback and 
allow the voicing of employee concerns. Questions and answers should be 
posted for each of the agencies employees to view. As a result of 
continuous communication, employees will have the opportunity to learn 
about each other’s agency and address any questions or concerns they may 
have, and gradually phase in the cultures of other agencies.204  In the case 
of cross-disciplinary teams, persons tasked with implementation of a 
merged policy or procedure should begin by researching, interviewing and 
studying the various agency response personnel to gather the identity of 
each other’s agency. 
• The interactions between psychological needs and the organizational 
culture can be described as the person-environment fit (cultural alignment) 
and describes why employees seek and remain committed to organizations 
that are a good match for them.205 With any type of organizational 
change, employees can become uneasy or not sure that the previous 
alignment with the organization will be maintained in the new 
organization. In the case of cross-disciplinary teams, employees can worry 
about their prior individual status within their organization and how that 
will transform to the new team concept. One of the organizational 
differences include police officers who are used to working in more 
individualistic roles, being asked to mesh with the fire culture which can 
be more group oriented.206  Other differences between public safety 
agencies can include managerial approaches, types of organizations such 
as paramilitary and structured approaches, types of work environment, and 
general attitudes and demeanors of the employees. One of the strategies 
for integrating disparate cultures can include the education of employees 
on each of the other agencies culture to avoid them utilizing personal 
experience and bias as their guide. One of the formal processes can be 
accomplished during the training and implementation process of 
describing the differences in culture that each agency possesses and what 
they should expect during the implementation of cross-disciplinary teams. 
The informal process can be accomplished through training guidelines, 
question and answer sessions and informal communication. Regardless of 
the method(s) utilized, cultural differences cannot be ignored and must be 
addressed to provide the implementation of cross-disciplinary teams with 
the best chance of success. 
• Employer-employee reciprocity or “reciprocation” can be described as 
the two-way interaction between the employees and their employer and 
204 Ibid., 152. 
205 Ibid. 
206 Ibid., 153. 
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the expectations that each of them have of the other.207  Employees 
expect the fulfillment of their needs such as compensation, benefits, 
equipment and safety; while the employer desires the employees to 
provide sound and equitable work for the compensation they are 
provided.208  When implementing cross-disciplinary teams, these 
expectations need to be preserved during the integration process to avoid 
adding additional psychological stress to the mergers of the various 
cultures. To avoid any potential pitfalls and limit any resentment to the 
team concept, employers can provide incentives in the form of pay 
incentives for formal team participation, increased training, enhanced 
tactical equipment, and various status symbols such as team recognition 
and identification.   
Cameron and Quinn remind us that the dependence of organizational 
improvement on culture change is due to the fact that when the values, orientations, 
definitions, and goals stay constant, even when procedures and strategies are altered, 
organizations quickly return to the status quo.209  In their survey of 1,742 U.S. and 
European companies, 69% of the companies in Europe and 75% of those in the U.S. had 
engaged in at least one reengineering project. The results showed that 85% of the firms 
polled reported little or no gain from their effort. The authors of the study concluded that 
reengineering alone was not enough to produce a desirable change within their 
organization.210  Although the tools and techniques may be present for process 
improvements to occur, the reengineering had to be integrated with an overall approach 
to changing an organization’s culture to achieve organizational benefits.211  If 
organizations or individual sections do not change the fundamental goals, values, and 
expectations of individuals, change remains superficial and short duration.212  Failure to 
successfully integrate cultural differences and implement effective cross-disciplinary 
teams can often produce cynicism, frustration, loss of trust, and deterioration in morale 
207 Ibid., 155. 
208 Ibid.  
209 Cameron and Quinn, Diagnosing and Changing Organizational Culture, 11. 
210 Ibid., 10. 
211 Ibid., 11. 
212 Ibid. 
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among the public safety members and may jeopardize the implementation of the cross-
disciplinary team concept.213   
Being aware of cultural differences and modifying organizational culture is key to the 
successful implementation of major improvement strategies which can include the 
implementation of cross-disciplinary teams during complex hostile events.214  Integrating 
the interpersonal dynamics of police, fire and EMS cultures is critical in the culmination 
of a culturally compliant cross-disciplinary team concept. The interpersonal interactions 
between the agencies members may be the biggest change, requiring the most amount of 
effort to successfully integrate.   
C. SUMMARY 
The benefits of cross-disciplinary teams in an active shooter situation were 
presented in Chapter II but understanding the reasons teams are successful require careful 
analysis and execution. The key elements of establishing clear and unchanging goals, 
team leadership, and team cooperation all play an important role in achieving team 
effectiveness which is measured against the ultimate performance of the team. Cross-
disciplinary teams create the opportunity for multi-discipline coordination that can 
enhance effective operations in the hostile event environment. Research has determined 
the various aspects of cross-disciplinary teams and their unique characteristics that lead 
towards success include the initial management actions, the people that make up the 
teams and the team and personal behaviors that are displayed. The organizational and 
team environment to include the organizational structure and the selection of team 
membership, team design to include the team size and composition, and the team 
processes to include the development of the team, their associated roles, and the 
cohesiveness of the team all influence the effectiveness of the cross-disciplinary team. 
The successful implementation of cross-disciplinary teams can often be classified as a 
collaborative merger where the success of the team depends on the ability to integrate the 
cultures of police, fire and EMS while taking into account the successes and best 
213 Ibid., 11–12. 
214 Ibid., 12. 
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practices of each of the participating agencies working toward a common mission.215 
While diversity can be a positive trait for a team, the diversity found within cross-
disciplinary teams can also be a barrier to success if not taken into account. One of the 
most important and overlooked traits of team diversity is that of differing cultures.   
Research informs us that the social identity or culture of each organization is a 
powerful force that drives each agency, and the combination of these various agencies 
into one cross-disciplinary team requires a successful merging of these cultures. The 
successful merging of cultures requires acknowledgement and management of the various 
characteristics of each type of culture to allow the cross-disciplinary team members to 
integrate smoothly and effectively work together. The use of a qualitative analysis can 
assist in developing a unified team culture and aide in the development of new policies 
and methodologies for handling these hostile events in a cross-disciplinary manner. Any 
failure in the merging of the various public safety cultures can have a negative effect on 
the outcome of not only effective teams but a negative outcome for the incident. An 
adequate investment in time on the front-end of cross-disciplinary team development may 
pay dividends in the successful outcome of hostile events and the saving of lives and 
property. 
215 Cartwright and Cooper, “The Role of Culture Compatibility in Successful Organizational 
Marriage,” 64. 
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IV. METHODOLOGY AND DESIGN 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This thesis examines the enablers and barriers for deploying cross-disciplinary 
teams with the purpose of safely and effectively mitigating emergent complex, hostile 
events. Action Research is a participatory process that involves all those who have a 
stake in the issue engaging in systematic inquiry to be investigated.216  Action Research 
provides a means to systematically investigate and inquire how public safety agencies can 
accomplish the desired goal of implementing a first responder cross-disciplinary action 
plan and evaluate its effectiveness through a practical exercise. The data include archival 
reporting from an active shooter full-scale practical exercise (called Exercise Secure) that 
was conducted by a federal entity to test the validity of the Fairfax County Unified 
Hostile Event Action Guide as well as emergency response plans of the federal facility. 
This chapter describes the design of the full-scale exercise, data collection, and the 
method used to analyze the data. 
B. FULL-SCALE EXERCISE DESIGN 
The emergency management program office for the federal agency designed and 
hosted a one-day active shooter full-scale practical exercise at their secure government 
facility which will remain unnamed and known as the “facility.”   The facility is a United 
States government facility on the east coast. It maintains high security features and the 
employment of private armed security on a 24-hour basis. The facility is a campus-style 
facility with numerous buildings of various sizes and height and open areas surrounding 
many of the buildings. Areas below grade are also common throughout the facility.   
Participants in this exercise included the internal staff of the facility 
(administration and security), agency medical response personnel, and the local 
responders representing the County police department and fire and rescue department. 
The units and personnel assigned to the full-scale exercise were actual units that would 
216 Ernest T. Stringer, Action Research, 3rd ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE, 2007), 6 
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respond to the facility if this had been an actual incident. The responses included over 25 
fire and rescue units with over 80 police, fire and rescue, and security responders 
participating, which is  reflective an initial response algorithm for this type of event.  
One of the major goals of this exercise was to implement the cross-disciplinary 
team concept (Rescue Task Force and Extraction Task Force). This involved police, and 
fire and EMS working together in a team to perform patient assessment, treat life 
threatening injuries, extract the victims from the area of threat, transport to a CCP and/or 
treatment area, and provide security for the team. Responding personnel were advised 
that the exercise was intended to test the validity of the Fairfax County Unified Hostile 
Event Action Guide as well as the emergency response plans of the facility.   
The full-scale exercise required the exercise players to participate in a simulated 
response facilitated by the agency and facility staff. The scenario involved one active 
shooter moving among four separate locations in the facility complex which was initially 
reported to the security personnel at the facility. All law enforcement and fire and rescue 
personnel were advised and checked to have all weapons secured outside of this exercise 
and law enforcement/facility personnel were provided with simulated/inert training 
weapons as required. Responding personnel were confronted with a total of 43 victims, 
all with various types of injuries; 21 victims at scene 1, 12 victims at scene 2, and 10 
victims at scene 3. The response was multi-faceted with an initial response to the 
shooting from the facility/agency security staff, followed by local police and fire and 
rescue personnel. The County’s Department of Public Safety Communications was also a 
participant with all calls for assistance initially routing through the dispatch center in 
order to replicate an actual event. Police and fire and rescue resources were staged at a 
nearby location and were dispatched to the scene in a realistic response time frame. The 
incident unfolded in a traditional response manner with all participants acting according 
to the policies and procedures that they have been provided and trained upon. The 
exercise concluded when all 43 victims were accounted for and either extracted from the 
areas of threat and transported to a treatment area or simulated medical facility, or left in 
place if deceased.   
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C. QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE DATA COLLECTION AND 
ANALYSIS 
The Action Research approach of this study follows the Look, Think, and Act217 
method documented by Stringer. Look involves gathering relevant information and data 
through a literature review of information related to past historical incidents and the 
concept of cross-disciplinary team. This review also focuses on the existing Fairfax 
County Unified Hostile Event Action Guide policy as well as other existing public safety 
policies on the use of cross-disciplinary teams. Think involves exploring and analyzing 
the information and data collected in order to interpret and explain the either enablers 
and/or barriers to implementation of a cross-disciplinary response. Lastly, Act is the 
output of this thesis and includes the information and data that has been gathered, 
explored and analyzed as well as resulting recommendations for the successful 
implementation of cross-disciplinary teams in hostile contexts.    
This thesis uses archival data that was collected during the full-scale exercise. None 
of the data included personally identifiable information (PII) or protected health 
information (PHI). The only data used for this study included the participants’ 
assessments of the effectiveness of the exercise, as described above. This exercise and 
data collection were conducted for the benefit of the federal agency and the public safety 
first responders.   
This study analyzes two sets of data from this exercise: 
• Five pre-exercise questions were provided to six participants representing 
the participating disciplines of police, fire and EMS, and security. These 
questions were distributed eight months prior to the actual full-scale-
exercise and completed in a paper and pen format. The questions gauged 
the level of knowledge of the guidelines for response prior to the actual 
exercise (see Appendix B).   
• A post-exercise analysis was completed by the sixty-eight exercise 
participants and seven observers and administrators with specific 
questions regarding the use of cross-disciplinary teams during the 
exercise. The data included observations from the exercise observers and 
administrators, and participant feedback to questions administered by the 
federal agency. Seventeen quantitative questions and three qualitative 
217 Stringer, Action Research, 8–9. 
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questions were provided to the respondents and completed in a paper and 
pen format (see Appendix C). 
Using data from the five pre-exercise responses, themes were developed that 
identified enablers and barriers for the use of the cross-disciplinary team concept and the 
actual upcoming exercise. The pre-exercise questions provided the exercise 
administrators with several perceived issues or concerns prior to the execution of the full-
scale exercise. The qualitative responses aided in the identification of significant 
objectives for the full-scale exercise and areas of concern to which the evaluators could 
pay closer attention too during the actual exercise.   The pre-exercise themes also aided 
in the development of the full-scale exercise questionnaire.   These themes included the 
problems or issues expected from the team concept of fire and police working together; 
whether cross-functional teams will accomplish the mission of police, fire and EMS in an 
active shooter environment; the potential barriers of success of the cross-functional team 
concept; the type of training, equipment, and resources needed for success; and the 
opinion if Fairfax County is prepared to handle an active shooter incident. 
The 17 quantitative and qualitative post-exercise questions were administered to 
each of the participants (see Appendix C). These questions and associated responses were 
tabulated on a 1 to 6 (1=low, 6=high) scale with an option for “not applicable” if the 
question was not applicable to the evaluator or participant’s activity or mission or not 
observed. Analysis included calculating the overall group mean, (N=75) and standard 
deviation for each quantitative question. T-Test contrasts were analyzed to compare the 
mean ratings for: the disciplines (police, fire, security and other), evaluator versus 
participant, and members versus non-members of cross-disciplinary teams. Three 
additional qualitative questions were asked to capture the evaluator or participant’s 
perceived effectiveness of the cross-disciplinary team concept during the full-scale 
exercise. The three qualitative questions that were provided focused on the advantages 
and disadvantages of cross-disciplinary teams as well as potential barriers that may have 
existed within the teams. Thematic analysis was utilized to identify the issues and 




The research compiled as a result of Action Research and the associated full-scale 
practical exercise provided the opportunity to address the research questions as presented 
in this thesis. While a review of past historical incidents can provide key lessons learned 
and a potential look into the future, there is no guarantee that lessons learned will be 
adopted and applied to future incidents. The use of a full-scale scenario based practical 
exercise can be considered the most relevant analysis and training for public safety 
responders and administrators to test a new or improved method of incident mitigation. 
This chapter provides the research findings in the form of qualitative and quantitative 
data and analysis of the exercise which was conducted to determine how can public 
safety agencies effectively implement a first responder cross-disciplinary action plan to 
better coordinate police, fire and EMS responses in combined hostile events. The 
research identifies both enablers or barriers to the deployment of these teams and what 
are the benefits and risks of a cross-disciplinary approach from the eyes of persons that 
actually respond and mitigate these types of events. 
A. FULL-SCALE PRE-EXERCISE ANALYSIS 
Six participants responded to five pre-exercise questions that were distributed 
prior to the full-scale exercise with a purpose of providing the exercise administrators 
with several perceived enablers and barriers or concerns to the implementation of cross-
disciplinary teams. The responses aided in the identification of significant objectives for 
the full-scale exercise and areas of concern to which the evaluators could pay closer 
attention during the actual exercise. Using data from the five pre-exercise responses, 
themes were developed that identified enablers and barriers for the use of the cross-
disciplinary team concept and the actual upcoming exercise. The responses were placed 
in an Excel spreadsheet with each respondent having correlating responses to the five 
pre-exercise questions. Analysis of the raw qualitative data involved sorting and 
integrating to create patterns and themes from the responses provided. These themes are 
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presented for each of the five pre-exercise questions. The pre-exercise themes aided in 
the development of the full-scale exercise questionnaire. 
1. What problems or issues do you expect from this ‘team concept” of police 
and fire working together? 
Responses centered on coordination of armed responders, the communication and 
implementation of unified command, and the ambiguity regarding responsibility and 
authority for actions. Four of the six responses provided reference to potential problems 
associated with communication among the responders from police and fire and rescue, 
especially with regard to the establishment of joint unified command. Without adequate 
communication among the disciplines and the establishment of unified command, 
potential problems can arise regarding the coordination of armed responders, unknown 
areas of responsibility among the responders, and the establishment of unified command 
that provides clear direction and representation of all disciplines. Responses indicated a 
need for a coordinated response that is based upon pre-established policies, procedures 
and action plans. It was also noted by one respondent that the cross-disciplinary team 
concept may not be effective and may create unnecessary risk to the responders and 
agency staff. 
2. Do you think that the cross-functional team or “Rescue Task Force” 
concept as it is sometimes called is needed to accomplish the mission of 
police, fire and building security’s missions in an active shooter 
environment?  If not needed, why not? 
Four out of six respondents indicated “yes” to this question with two respondents 
indicating “no” or a neutral response. Responses indicated a concern for a lack of 
practical exercises and training regarding the use of cross-disciplinary teams which 
would lead to communication disparity among the responding agencies and disciplines. 
While the cross-disciplinary response that includes police and armed security officers 
working together would increase the number of armed responders in an active shooter 
environment, the response between police and agency security needs to be coordinated. 
One response indicated that police (law enforcement) need to secure the active shooter 
scene prior to rescue efforts being deployed by fire and rescue personnel. 
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3. What are potential barriers to the success of this cross-functional team 
concept? 
As with the implementation of any new procedure, it is important to identify 
potential barriers early to try and remediate them prior to implementation. In this case, 
identifying potential barriers prior to the actual exercise would aid in the establishment of 
objectives for the full-scale exercise. Two of the six respondents indicated no potential 
barriers to the cross-disciplinary team concept, while two others identified 
communication as a barrier to include the identification of “who is in charge” of the team 
and how they would communicate among themselves, as well as the lack of command 
presence were noted. Other potential barriers included a lack of combined training and 
familiarity with the other members of the cross-disciplinary team which could lead to 
distrust and problems agreeing to a unified plan of action.    The lack of clear roles and 
authority of the specific cross-disciplinary team members was identified as a barrier 
which could potentially lead to members of the team having varying agenda’s and not 
following direction or established policies. The roles of the members must include the 
identification of the agency staff, security officers and public safety responders to avoid 
any miss-interpretation of the varying roles and responsibilities. 
4. What type of training, equipment or resources would you need to make the 
cross-functional team concept a success? 
Providing the cross-disciplinary team members with the proper training, 
equipment and resources is paramount for an effective response. Two of the six 
respondents indicated the need for ICS and unified command training and the 
commitment to utilize these on actual emergency incidents. Other respondents indicated 
the need for additional training and familiarity with the agencies buildings and response 
procedures, adequate protective gear, the need for joint communications, an effective 
memorandum of understanding clearly outlining the roles and responsibilities between 
the agency and public safety responders, and the need for compatible policies and 
procedures between responders. 
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5. Do you think we in Fairfax County are prepared today to handle an “active 
shooter” incident such as Columbine or Mumbai, India?  Please elaborate 
if you can. 
Two of the six respondents indicated “no,” one as “unsure,” and the remaining 
three respondents as either as “ready as we can be” or “it depends” with one providing his 
concerns. Some responses felt that these types of incidents can never be handled because 
the “fire power” of the persons doing harm will exceed local law enforcement while 
others provided no definitive response. Some of the major concerns centered on problems 
with communication capability and span of control due to the influx of responders to the 
scene which will create accountability problems for command. The need for collaboration 
between the agency staff and public safety responders was listed, which relates back to 
the identification and awareness of the various roles and responsibilities of the various 
agencies responding to the incident. 
B. FULL-SCALE EXERCISE ANALYSIS 
One of the goals of the full-scale exercise was to implement and evaluate the 
cross-disciplinary teams (“Rescue Task Force’s” and Extraction Task Force’s) in an 
active shooter environment.   The post-exercise analysis involved questions related to the 
use of the cross-disciplinary team concept compared to procedures utilized in the past 
regarding fire and EMS staging until the incident is declared “safe” by police. These 
post-exercise questions included the themes developed from the five pre-exercise 
questions. The themes and findings utilized in the post-exercise questions development 
included the problems or issues as well as the barriers to the implementation of cross-
disciplinary teams in an active shooter environment. The questions included what 
training, equipment, or resources are needed to make the cross-disciplinary teams a 
success and whether cross-disciplinary teams are needed to accomplish the mission of 
police, fire and EMS to mitigate these types of complex hostile events. Examples include 
questions related to the ability of cross-disciplinary teams to realize a reduction in time to 
mitigate the incident, ability of the agencies to trust and communicate with one another, 
and the ability of the teams to overcome conflict and effectively collaborate on the 
emergency incident scene. Analysis included the perceived utilization of teamwork, 
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agency preparedness, and perceived barriers to the use of cross-disciplinary teams to 
accomplish the mission of treating and removing causalities on the scene in a rapid and 
safe manner.   
Seventeen quantitative questions were tabulated on a 1 to 6 (1=low, 6=high) scale 
with an option for “not applicable” if the question was not applicable to the evaluator or 
participant’s activity or mission or not observed. This analysis included the overall group 
mean (n=75 respondents) and standard deviation for each question. A t-test comparison 
of sub-group means was also done. These comparisons included the disciplines (police, 
fire, security and other), evaluator versus participant, and member of cross-disciplinary 
team and those not a member of the team. These contrasts were chosen to evaluate 
whether groups perceive the effectiveness differently. Three additional qualitative post 
exercise questions were asked to capture the evaluator or participant’s perceived 
effectiveness of the cross-disciplinary team concept during the full-scale exercise.   
1. Overall Quantitative Survey Results 
The seventeen questions and the calculated means and standard deviations from 
the seventy-five respondents are listed in Table 1. 
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Table 1.   Post-Full-Scale Analysis Questions 
 POST-FULL-SCALE ANALYSIS QUESTIONS 
TOTAL GROUP ANALYSIS 






Top leadership in your organization is supportive of this new cross-
disciplinary team concept/procedure. 
5.2 
(.9) 
QP Police, fire/EMS and security trusted each other’s ability to perform 




Police, fire/EMS and security were willing to communicate and share 




Cross-disciplinary team members were provided with appropriate 
police force protection (security) while operating in the warm zone. 
4.5 
(1.2) 
QN Cross-disciplinary team members were empowered to make decisions 
regarding the establishment of tactical goals for the team. 
4.5 
(1.1) 
QR Cross-disciplinary team members were aware of their individual roles 
and responsibilities on this exercise. 
4.4 
(1.3) 
QG The use of terminology was commonly understood by all responders 
(police, security, and fire/EMS) during this exercise. 
4.3 
(1.3) 
QH Cross-disciplinary teams (Rescue Task Force) enhanced the ability for 




The identification of the casualty collection point and point(s) of entry 
was clearly communicated to the cross-disciplinary team members. 
4.2 
(1.4) 
QO This cross-disciplinary concept has led to a reduction in time to triage, 




Accountability for the cross-disciplinary team members was maintained 
at the incident/unified command post. 
4.0 
(1.2) 
QF Personnel responding to this exercise understood each other’s agencies 
response procedures for mitigating an “Active Shooter” incident. 
3.9 
(1.3) 
QJ Appropriate work zones (Hot, Warm and Cold) were established and 




The individual cultures of police and fire/EMS provided a barrier to 
team effectiveness and collaboration during this exercise. 
3.9 
(1.52) 
QE Participants in this exercise received adequate training on this new 




Cross-disciplinary team effectiveness was challenged by conflict 
among team members due to real or perceived differences in the 




Effective unified command procedures aided in reducing the “staging 





Analysis provided an overall moderately high level of confidence in the concept 
and use of cross-disciplinary teams and the various disciplines to work together. All but 
one question (QD) have a mean above the mid-point (3.5) on the 6-point rating scale. 
Question U (mean=5.2) reflected the highest mean by the respondents acknowledging the 
high degree support by top leadership in this new cross-disciplinary team concept. While 
this is not reflective of the actual confidence in the use of cross-disciplinary teams and 
collaboration between disciplines, it does reflect the needed support from top leadership 
that will enable the cross-disciplinary team concept to potentially succeed. Four other 
highest rated questions were found to be note-worthy.   A high degree of confidence was 
identified in the ability of the various disciplines to trust each other’s ability to perform 
their duties during an active shooter event (QP mean=4.8).    The respondents who 
provided ratings of 5 or 6 equaled 72%, indicating a very high degree of confidence in 
the question. The qualitative theme from 13% of the respondents that provided an 
explanation to question P indicated no barriers to police, fire/EMS and security trusting 
each other’s ability and no reluctance or hesitancy on the part of the cross-disciplinary 
team members to get the job accomplished. Also rated high was the various disciplines’ 
willingness to communicate and share information (QS mean=4.8) as well as the feeling 
of empowerment of cross-disciplinary team members to make decisions regarding the 
tactical goals for the team (QN mean=4.5). Of the respondents to question N, 35% 
provided a N/A indicating that they did not participate directly in a cross-disciplinary 
team or did not observe the decision making process for the team. The high mean values 
provided to each of these questions indicate the ability and willingness for the 
participants to actively participate as a member of a cross-disciplinary team. Team 
members also felt that they were provided with appropriate force protection which is 
paramount for the team to remain effective, safe, and operational within the warm zone 
(QI mean=4.5).   Overall, the support of top leadership to maintain and enhance this 
concept along with the respondents’ confidence and willingness to participate in the 
cross-disciplinary team concept provides an encouraging indication for this method of 
hostile event mitigation.    
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Analysis indicated the lowest level of confidence in the ability of unified 
command to reduce the “staging time” for fire and EMS personnel with low ratings 
assigned to members receiving adequate training prior to this exercise (QD mean=3.4). 
The combined low ratings equaled 33%, with respondents indicating a rating of 1 or 2. 
The primary theme of the qualitative comments by 9% of the respondents explaining the 
ratings indicates a perceived delay from unified command in the deployment of the 
Rescue Task Force which did not lead to a reduction in the “staging time” for fire and 
EMS personnel. Respondents also felt that they received less than adequate training on 
this new cross-disciplinary team method prior to the exercise (QE mean=3.6; and 16% 
giving a rating of 1 or 2 to this question). It can be concluded that due to this exercise 
utilizing a new concept in the use of cross-disciplinary teams and the limited practice of 
these concepts, respondents understandably rated the actual effectiveness and perceived 
benefit somewhat low. It can be expected that as confidence is enhanced through training 
and the willingness of the various disciplines to work together is supported, the perceived 
and actual benefit of the use of cross-disciplinary teams can be realized. 
Two questions provided evidence of the respondent’s optimistic outlook for the 
ability of cross-disciplinary teams to have a positive outcome in the treatment of 
causalities. Question H (mean=4.2) provided a moderately high degree of confidence in 
the ability of cross-disciplinary teams (Rescue Task Force’s) to enhance the ability for 
Fire and EMS to triage and treat casualties in the warm zone. This high degree of 
confidence was evidenced by 64% of the respondents indicating a high rating of 5 or 6, 
while 76% indicated a positive rating with ratings of 4, 5 or 6. Question O (mean=4.1) 
provides a moderately high degree of confidence in the ability of the cross-disciplinary 
team concept to lead to a reduction in time to triage, treat, and transport causalities from 
the warm zone during the exercise. In response to question O, 35% indicated a high 
degree of confidence with ratings of 5 or 6, while 56% indicated a positive rating with 
ratings of 4, 5 or 6. While 56% of the respondents indicate a high rating, 34% provided 
ratings of 3 or less, questioning the potential of the cross-disciplinary approach. Some of 
the challenges to the development of SOP’s, communications, unified command 
procedures, and training will improve as the concept is developed and exercised, which 
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could enhance the overall potential benefit of the cross-disciplinary team method. These 
responses by the participants provide a positive analysis for the impact that a cross-
disciplinary team can in fact work and make a positive difference in the medical care of 
the injured. These two questions signify that the participants felt that a cross-disciplinary 
team approach enhanced the tactical ability of fire and EMS to provide patient care, and 
lead to a reduction in the time to triage, treat, and transport causalities out of an area of 
threat. 
2. Group Comparisons of Quantitative Survey Results 
To provide further analysis, the mean ratings were compared for each of the four 
disciplines (police, fire, security and other) in each of the questions. Statistical 
comparisons (ANOVA) of the four various groups were evaluated to determine if the 
various groups rated the questions differently. Utilizing a significance level of p < .05, 
only one question was found to have a significant difference in how different groups 
rated the questions. The analysis generally showed that there was no statistically 
significant difference across the subgroup mean ratings and perceptions. However, 
subgroup sample sizes are small, so further investigations of differences may be 
warranted. The only question showing significant differences between groups was 
question S which showed that the security respondents had a significantly higher rating 
(mean=5.7) on effective communication and information sharing between police, fire/
EMS and security, than did the police (mean=4.6) and the “other” group (mean=4.3). The 
difference between security and fire (mean=4.8) was not found to be statistically 
significant. It can be noted that this exercise was one of the first times that facility 
security staff participated in a cross-disciplinary team and hands-on training with the 
local law enforcement, possibly leading to a higher degree of perceived satisfaction and 
information shared. 
In the statistical comparison of evaluators versus participants in the exercise, the 
level of significance was insignificant. The analysis indicated no difference between 
evaluators and participants in how they rated the assessments. 
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In looking at the statistical comparison of whether staff were assigned to cross-
disciplinary teams or not, a majority of the questions showed no statistical difference. 
Two questions were exceptions and provided the strongest significant difference between 
team members and non-team members. For question Q, there is a significant difference 
between those on a team (mean =3.2), and those not on a team (mean=4.0). This is 
interpreted that those members assigned to a cross-disciplinary team had a higher level of 
agreement than those not on the team. This agreement was with regard to the feeling that 
team effectiveness was challenged by conflict among members due to real or perceived 
differences in the establishment of goals and priorities for the team. Even thou the team 
members showed a higher level of agreement (just over the midpoint of 3.5 on the 1–6 
scale), those members had greater exposure and were more sensitive to whatever 
challenges there were, due to conflicting goals and priorities within the team than those 
who were not on a team. The second significant t-test was also in comparison of team 
members with non-team members on question G.  Here, the mean for team members was 
3.9 and non-team members was 4.6 and this difference was statistically significant (p 
<.05).  Similar to question Q discussed above, this question finds that team members had 
weaker agreement than non-team members about whether terminology was commonly 
understood by all responders during the exercise.  It is possible that this is because there 
were actually more challenges in terminology in the cross-disciplinary teams than those 
not on cross-disciplinary teams.  Those not on teams were more likely to be interacting 
within their disciplinary units with less interaction with other disciplines.  While the 
mean rating for team members (3.9) is above the midpoint of the rating scale showing 
mild agreement, it suggests that this would be important to address in training cross-
disciplinary teams so they are familiar with different disciplines’ terminologies. 
Themes from the three qualitative post-exercise questions are provided here. The 
purpose of the questions was to focus on the advantages and disadvantages of cross-
disciplinary teams as well as potential barriers that may have existed in the formation of 
the teams. It was paramount to determine the perception of the respondents in this 
exercise regarding the establishment and use of cross-disciplinary teams in mitigating 
hostile events. These responses were also placed in an excel spreadsheet with each 
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respondent having correlating responses to the three post-exercise questions. Analysis of 
the questions provided raw qualitative data which was sorted and integrated to create 
patterns and themes among the responses provided. These themes are broken down into 
each of the three post-exercise questions and include generalized enablers and barriers 
that were identified by the seventy-five respondents as a result of the exercise. 
6. What are the advantages and disadvantages of using the cross-disciplinary 
team approach for responding to and mitigating a hostile (active shooter) 
event in comparison to the former concept of fire/EMS staging until the 
incident is declared “safe” by police? 
Of the 35 respondents that provided a qualitative answer to the advantages of 
cross-disciplinary teams, 26 indicated that the advantage of utilizing the cross-
disciplinary team approach over the former concept of fire and EMS “staging” until the 
scene is secured, was a quicker response to accessing the victims, subsequently providing 
faster treatment and transport of the victims out of the warm zone. Many of these 
responses also indicated greater efficiency and better organization of the incident scene, 
with a goal of a smooth and quick operation all leading towards the goal of saving more 
lives. Enhanced communication among the disciplines and cross-disciplinary team 
members were also noted as a common theme with this enhanced communication of 
sharing information among disciplines providing a safer environment for all of the public 
safety providers operating on the scene. 
The majority of the disadvantages acknowledged the increased risk to rescuers, 
especially fire and EMS personnel that have not routinely undertaken the risk of 
operating in the warm zone on a law enforcement event before. Five out of 29 responses 
indicated increased risk as a disadvantage. Other responses varied widely with four 
respondents acknowledging the required amount of training required for this concept to 
be successful and many respondents desiring more training in this area. Other responses 
indicated an acknowledgement and disadvantage of the different cultural aspects between 
the various disciplines of law enforcement, and fire and EMS, causing a barrier to 
effective teamwork. Differing goals, objectives and related functions between the 
disciplines of law enforcement and fire and EMS personnel was listed by several of the 
respondents as a barrier to the cross-disciplinary team concept. Differing goals and 
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objectives as well as fire and EMS personnel not trained in law enforcement tactics could 
be detrimental to the operation if the team is not provided with a common goal and 
accepted objectives. The various disciplines possessing different communication 
techniques and terminology that is not commonly understood by everyone were cited as a 
disadvantage by multiple respondents.   
7. Did the police, building security, and fire/EMS utilize teamwork to 
mitigate the incident or did they operate independently?  Please explain. 
Twenty-eight out of 30 personnel that answered the question in a yes or no format 
indicated that teamwork was utilized in lieu of operating independently. Many of the 
respondents indicated a delay in the fire and EMS personnel integrating with law 
enforcement causing a delay in the development and insertion of the RTFs and ETFs. 
This delay relayed to a delay in victim treatment, extraction from the warm zone, and 
transport time to a medical facility. It was noted in several responses that teamwork 
enhanced the overall communications between team members and disciplines as well as 
team members knowing their roles and working together. 
8. What barriers existed to the cross-disciplinary teams of law enforcement 
and fire/EMS to the mission of treating and removing causalities on the 
scene in a rapid manner? 
With seventy-five respondents participating in the survey and 31 providing 
responses to this question, 20 respondents indicated that barriers existed to cross-
disciplinary teams treating and removing causalities on the scene in a rapid manner. Of 
the responses, many duplicated the responses from question 3 indicating a delay in the 
fire and EMS personnel integrating with law enforcement causing a delay in the 
development and insertion of the RTFs and ETFs, subsequently causing a delay in victim 
treatment, extraction, and transport. A delay in establishing unified command, or 
ineffective unified command was noted by several respondents which may have added to 
the delay noted above. While several respondents cited unfamiliar goals and varying 
objectives among disciplines, this was certainly a minority with less than 5% indicating 
any issues with clarifying roles and responsibilities. Several other tactical needs or 
barriers were expressed such as the need for additional personnel to assist with victim 
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removal, confusion on radio terminology and communications, unfamiliarity with 
building layout, duplication in patient assessment and the need for using a patient 
marking system. The majority of the respondents (n=55) felt there were no or limited 
barriers to implementing the cross-disciplinary team concept which is a positive sign 
especially given as a post-exercise response 
C. SUMMARY 
The full-scale practical exercise provided a mechanism and learning environment 
for internal and external response personnel to exercise their response procedures and 
demonstrate their ability to respond in a cross-disciplinary manner to an active shooter 
type event. The response entities for the agency, local law enforcement and fire and 
rescue were able to demonstrate their response capabilities, authorities, roles and 
responsibilities and allowed responding personnel and agencies to clarify their response 
procedures.   
Three general themes can be concluded from the full-scale exercise, and they 
center on policy and protocol development, strategic and tactical operations, and the need 
for increased multi-discipline training. Responses indicated a need for a coordinated 
response that is based upon pre-established policies, procedures and action plans to 
ensure a coordinated effort where each discipline is aware of their individual roles and 
responsibilities. With regard to strategic and tactical operations, analysis provided an 
overall high level of confidence in the concept and use of cross-disciplinary teams, the 
various disciplines ability to work together, and a high degree of support from top 
leadership. This support for concept is complimented by no indication of barriers to the 
various disciplines ability to trust each other’s ability to perform their duties and get the 
job accomplished in a cross-disciplinary format. Exercise analysis indicated the lowest 
level of confidence in the ability of unified command to reduce the “staging time” for fire 
and EMS personnel however, post full-scale questions revealed a high degree of 
confidence in the ability of cross-disciplinary teams to enhance the ability for Fire and 
EMS to triage and treat casualties in the warm zone and lead to a reduction in time to 
triage, treat, and transport. 
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Post-exercise analysis indicated that there was no statistically significant 
differences across the subgroup mean ratings and perceptions of police, security, fire and 
EMS. One exception which centered on effective communication and information 
sharing between police, fire/EMS and security was noted but possibly attributed to the 
infrequent use of security in multi-agency and multi-discipline training.   In the statistical 
comparison of evaluators versus participants in the exercise, there were no statistically 
significant differences in the survey ratings of these two groups. In looking at the 
statistical comparison of whether staff were assigned to cross-disciplinary teams or not, a 
majority of the questions posed no statistical difference. Two exceptions were noted with 
regard to the feeling that team effectiveness was challenged by conflict among members 
due to real or perceived differences in the establishment of goals and priorities for the 
team and the finding that team members had weaker agreement than non-team members 
about whether terminology was commonly understood by all responders during the 
exercise.   
Analysis of the qualitative and qualitative data that was extracted from full-scale 
exercise provided the federal agency and the evaluators with a statistical look at the 
effectiveness of cross-disciplinary teams in an active shooter event, but also provided 
qualitative data and views from the participants that substantiated the statistical data and 
provided a snapshot of the enablers and barriers to the effective cross-disciplinary team 
approach. What can be concluded is a willingness and desire on behalf of the participants 
to utilize the cross-disciplinary team concept and teamwork during hostile or active 
shooter events. A small minority indicated barriers to cross-disciplinary teams treating 
and removing casualties in a rapid manner. While barriers were expressed such as 
cultural barriers and increased risk to fire and EMS personnel, it was the response of the 
public safety responders, that this concept is a functional and desired method of incident 
response, with many of the barriers solvable through training and the development of 
policies and procedures.   
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VI. SUMMARY, RECOMMENDATIONS AND 
CONCLUSION  
A. INTRODUCTION 
Complex hostile events such as those analyzed in this thesis have the potential to 
quickly overwhelm and challenge public safety agencies tasked with protecting their 
citizens. As evidenced by a review of past historical hostile events, incidents can occur in 
any locality regardless of their size, location, and capability. These incidents require the 
local jurisdiction to, not only prepare for, but assemble a coordinated and effective public 
safety response to mitigate the threat and reduce casualties. Public safety officials and 
community leaders must ensure confidence among their citizens for a safe and healthy 
community. The citizens of our communities cannot simply hope for their public safety 
responders to be prepared; they expect it. 
Current fire and Emergency Medical Services (EMS) policy directs personnel to 
“standby” until law enforcement declare a hostile scene “safe.”  This policy often leads to 
unnecessary loss of life because of the delayed fire and EMS response and subsequent 
victim treatment. Some policymakers are suggesting a deployment of cross-disciplinary 
law enforcement, fire, and EMS teams that would allow responders to act more rapidly 
and in a coordinated manner. 
This study’s primary research question was:  “How can public safety agencies 
effectively implement a first responder cross-disciplinary action plan to better coordinate 
police, fire, and EMS responses in combined hostile events?”  To answer this question, 
the author of this study reviewed past hostile and active shooter events, examined 
emerging cross-disciplinary response team policies, reviewed the relevant academic 
literature, and analyzed data from a full-scale hostile event exercise designed to 
incorporate a cross-disciplinary response. This chapter provides a summary of this 
study’s key findings as well as action recommendations and suggestions for future 
research. 
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B. SUMMARY OF RESEARCH FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Based on the research that was conducted for this thesis, five recommendations 
are offered. The key findings from this study are used to provide a rationale for each of 
the recommendations. 
1. Identify, Expand, and Integrate National Policies and Protocols to 
Support the Development of Unified Regional and Local Response 
Policies and Protocols 
Almost every finding contained within this thesis supported the need to develop 
and implement unified regional and local response policies and protocols which support 
the implementation of cross-disciplinary teams during a combined hostile or active 
shooter event. Findings derived from the literature show that these regional and local 
response policies should be developed from national model strategies as a way to create 
innovative best practices.218    These national strategies and policies, some of which are 
under development, will not only support regional and local policies, but will lead to the 
institutionalization of joint tactical operational procedures. These procedures will ensure 
coordination, collaboration and consistency among the various disciplines of police, fire, 
and EMS throughout the nation and support the cross-disciplinary team process.  
Rationale:  The research of current active policies in the Commonwealth of 
Virginia such as those in Arlington County, Fairfax County and the City of Fairfax, 
shows that jurisdictions have been developing their own regional and local policies and 
protocols for complex hostile or active shooter events. This non-standardized approach 
occurs due to the lack of a national policy or agreement by discipline labor organizations. 
This approach of differing response strategies and tactics causes confusion and disorder 
on the incident scene, especially when mutual aide or state and federal resources are 
called in to assist.   
An examination of emerging response policies found that, the Department of 
Homeland Security and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, in cooperation with the 
International Association of Fire Chiefs (IAFC), International Chiefs of Police, 
218 Frazzano and Snyder, “A Paradigm Shift for First Responders,” 36–38. 
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International Association of Firefighters (IAFF), and other groups have recommended the 
adoption of national best practices and operational considerations that provide local 
police, fire, and EMS agencies and associated localities with ways to better integrate, 
coordinate, and improve responses to mass casualty shootings.219  These 
recommendations include the integration of planning and training efforts, development of 
policies, and increasing communication and interoperability that support the common and 
joint response to a mass casualty shooting.220  The results of this meeting led to the 
release, in September 2013, of the U.S. Fire Administration’s Fire/Emergency Medical 
Services Department Operational Considerations and Guide for Active Shooter and Mass 
Casualty Incidents that can be used to support the planning and preparation for active 
shooter and mass casualty incidents.221  The IAFF also released position papers 
supporting the development of SOPs and the development of sufficient public safety 
resources to deal with these events, support of the Rescue Task Force Concept, and a 
position statement on Tactical EMS to include TECC. In the UK, the government sets out 
national guidance for responding to a marauding terrorist firearms attack and sets out at a 
strategic level, the common vision of the challenges, the roles and responsibilities, and 
priority tasks for the emergency services which is set forth in the document, “Responding 
to a Marauding Terrorist Firearms Attack; The Role of the Emergency Services.”222  This 
document provides guidance on basic joint operating principles including the 
identification, mobilization and scene assessment, casualty management, and fire hazards 
management.   
National policies and protocols such as those adopted in the UK provide an 
overarching strategy, framework and standardized approach for all emergency services to 
adhere to. As identified in the post full-scale exercise analysis, a relatively low number of 
respondents identified that their personnel understood other agencies’ response 
219 Ibid., 37. 
220 Ibid. 
221 United States Fire Administration, Fire/Emergency Medical Services Department Operational 
Considerations, 2. 
222 Emergency Services Marauding Terrorist Firearms Attack CONOPS Coordination Working 
Group, “Responding to a Marauding Terrorist Firearms Attack; The Role of the Emergency Services” 
(unpublished manuscript, 2010). 
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procedures for mitigating an active shooter incident (3.9 on a 6-point scale). This 
response identified unfamiliarity with existing agency protocols and response procedures, 
which the adoption of national policies and protocols could help eliminate. A national 
policy will strengthen and support the various localities and eliminate confusion by 
providing an overarching strategy, standardized and consistent tactical procedures, 
training and resources, and potential monetary support through the various Homeland 
Security Grant programs. 
2. Develop and Implement Unified Regional and Local Response Policies 
and Protocols 
Recommendations from historical incidents such as Columbine, and Mumbai, 
India, and exercises such as the tabletop and full-scale exercises conducted in Fairfax 
County, Virginia include the joint development and sharing of operational policies or 
standard operating procedures (SOPs) that coordinate the efforts of the participating 
agencies and localities, and identify and codify their roles and responsibilities. Regional 
templates should be developed that provide a joint response framework for police, fire 
and EMS, identify common terminology, response and mitigation techniques that support 
a shared philosophy, and a template that has the support from the area agencies and 
political leaders. Localities should include a structure for communicating these policies 
and SOPs, a methodology for ensuring compliance, and a method to ensure that they are 
updated, maintained, and exercised. 
Rationale:  During past historical incidents such as Columbine High School and 
Mumbai India, and the table-top and full-scale exercises conducted, civilian agency staff 
and public safety responders of police, fire, and EMS identified a lack of familiarity with 
each other’s operational protocols and response procedures and identified a need to 
improve coordination between the various local security agencies.223224  This was also 
confirmed in this thesis research where survey findings showed respondents reporting 
unfamiliarity with each agency’s protocol’s during active shooter events. Historical 
223 Rabasa et al., The Lessons of Mumbai, 22. 
224  DHS, Wanton Violence at Columbine High School, 31. 
 86 
                                                 
events included in this thesis identify numerous examples of a lack of coordination 
between agencies on the emergency incident scene, and local incidents such as police and 
fire debriefs conducted after incidents, also indicated a lack of understanding of each 
agencies protocols and policies during the incident.225  This occurred at a time when 
agencies were not encouraged to operate as a cross-disciplinary team. 
During the tabletop exercise conducted prior to the full-scale exercise, a lack of 
familiarity with protocols and procedures was identified in all phases of the incident to 
include the mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery phases. This lack of 
familiarity can raise problems including the initial call for assistance, the authority for an 
effective joint response, expectations of the operational response and tactics to be 
utilized, familiarity with the building(s) and staff, overall responsibility of each of the 
participants’ discipline for tactical operations and notifications, and accountability for the 
victims/workers. The tabletop after-action report and responses to the exercise questions 
revealed the lack of hostile event or active shooter plans, policies, and procedures and 
limited or no templates on how the various agencies will respond and deploy in a 
coordinated and unified manner on the emergency incident scene.   
3. Implement a Unified Hostile Event or Active Shooter Transition 
Team to Support the Development of Cross-Disciplinary Teams 
The findings in this thesis indicates the need for a unified hostile event or active 
shooter transition team that not only supports the implementation of cross-disciplinary 
teams, but works through the identified enablers and barriers of implementing cross-
disciplinary teams, many of which are systemic and cultural in nature. The enablers and 
benefits include enhanced communication, increased productivity especially in the area 
of speed, improved processes that build on diverse backgrounds and experiences, and 
distributed workloads. Barriers and challenges include diversity, multiple reporting 
relationships, lack of trust, non-supportive leadership, interpersonal conflict and the lack 
of shared or overarching (national, regional or local) policies and procedures that 
facilitate cross-disciplinary teams.  
225 Dawson, “Police and Fire Debrief” (unpublished manuscript, September 2009). 
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Rationale:  Research and the full-scale exercise shows that cross-disciplinary 
teams bring a number of benefits to the multi-agency and multi-jurisdictional response; 
however, the cohesion and effectiveness of these teams is not without a risk of failure.226  
Smart and Barnum and training exercises such as the table-top and full-scale exercises 
analyzed here have shown us that cross-disciplinary teams bring a variety of benefits 
such as the collaborative effort of combining highly qualified information and people 
together and the ability to leverage resources and improve work products and systems.227  
These collaborative efforts require an investment in the development of open and explicit 
communication within cross-disciplinary teams if we are to expect success.228  The Team 
Effectiveness Model as introduced by McShane and Glinow provides the necessary 
elements of an effective team and the necessary standards the participating agencies of 
police, fire, and EMS can use to evaluate their efforts.229  What makes this model salient 
to this research is the understanding of factors that impact team effectiveness and how 
they must align with the goals of the team and participating organizations to ensure 
successful implementation. The implementation of cross-disciplinary teams is requiring 
the agencies of police, fire, and EMS to alter their response protocols and change their 
respective cultures to allow cross-disciplinary teams the opportunity to succeed. 
Localities implementing cross-disciplinary teams as part of their response procedures 
must invest the appropriate level of effort into the development of these teams that will 
take into account the team dynamics as well as the cultures of each of the individual 
agencies and associated personnel. The analysis of the participant responses following the 
full-scale exercise conducted in Fairfax County, Virginia, provided an overall moderately 
high level of confidence and support of the cross-disciplinary team concept, a moderately 
high level of support from their top leadership, and trust among the disciplines of police, 
fire and EMS. This high level of confidence and trust can be attributed to the investment 
226 Smart and Barnum, “Communication in Cross-Functional Team,” 19–20. 
227 Ibid., 19. 
228 Ibid., 20. 
229 McShane and Glinow, Organizational Behavior Essentials, 135–136 
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that Fairfax County has made into the development of an active shooter cross-disciplinary 
policy and training associated with cross-disciplinary teams which is still on-going. 
Literature provided by Stinchcomb and Ordaz recommends the formation of a 
hostile event or active shooter transition team that will provide coordination of the 
process that will aid in the development of cross-disciplinary teams.230  The transition 
team should include a representation of management, operations, and support personnel 
from each of the disciplines of police, fire, and EMS. Their purpose would be to align the 
individual cultural and procedural identities of their agency or area of expertise with the 
new mission of the cross-disciplinary team. This team should place particular emphasis 
on preservation of the distinctiveness of their agencies’ organizational culture, their role 
in altering relationships, and their psychological impact on employees.231  As suggested 
by Stinchcomb and Ordaz, this transition team should be tasked with performing a 
qualitative analysis that reviews each agency’s administrative and procedural documents 
and conducting interviews with agency members, its leadership, and labor organizations 
that are being tasked with implementing the new unified policy and methodology. This 
qualitative analysis and subsequent interviews should identify the potential enablers and 
barriers to the success of cross-disciplinary teams and provide the foundation for the 
development of a joint multi-agency or multi-discipline policy or SOP and the steps 
necessary to ensure successful team development and cultural integration. The transition 
team should make two-way communication a high priority by conducting employee and 
agency outreach to all of the stakeholders with the intent to gather input and share 
information and feedback regarding the establishment of a joint cross-disciplinary team 
program. 
4. Implement Joint Operational Procedures to Support the Cross-
Disciplinary Team Concept 
It was identified through the action research done for this thesis, that while a 
policy or protocol change can be implemented, it is the operational tactics that must 
230 Stinchcomb and Ordaz, “The Integration of Two ‘Brotherhoods’ into One Organizational 
Culture,” 152. 
231 Ibid., 150. 
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change to make these cross-disciplinary teams effective. Operational deficiencies 
identified through a review of past historical incidents and exercises, a review of 
literature, and action research in the form a full-scale practical exercise, included a lack 
of awareness of other agencies’ and localities actions and procedures, confusion on the 
responsibility of each agency, and the lack of familiarity and identification of the 
facilities and personnel.   
Rationale:  Recommendations provided by literature developed by the 
Washington Metropolitan COG, the IAFF, and the United States Fire Administration, and 
analysis provided by the tabletop and full-scale exercises, include the establishment of a 
joint cross-disciplinary public safety active shooter or hostile event policy or SOP. This 
SOP would provide the agencies of police, fire, and EMS with an established policy 
describing the operational methods and tactics to be used in this type of event. The policy 
or SOP should provide for the use of the National Incident Management System (NIMS) 
and the Incident Command System (ICS), response protocols to address the number and 
type of response, training levels, personal protective equipment (PPE), operational 
environment and scope of practice, joint training requirements between agencies, use of 
Rescue Task Force concept, and common terminology.232  This policy or SOP should 
provide for effective coordination and collaboration between the public safety 
responders, local jurisdictional leaders, and agency staff they will be integrating. The 
policy or SOP should address issues include accessing, triaging, treating and extracting 
victims, common terminology, tracking of patients, and information sharing. In addition, 
the locality and agencies should adopt national best practices that begin to provide 
standardization of national accepted response models and tactics. These include the 
adoption of the Rescue Task Force and Extraction Task Force concepts as well as the 
concept of Tactical Emergency Casualty Care (TECC) to triage and treat the victims. 
These response models and tactics should also include the procurement and use of 
enhanced PPE such as ballistic protection and the medical equipment and supplies 
associated with TECC.   
232 “IAFF Position Statement: Active Shooter Events.” 
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5. Develop and Implement Regularly Established Joint Training and 
Exercises 
It was identified through post-exercise questioning and the analysis of the full-
scale exercise, that while national and local policies and protocols can be established and 
operational tactics transformed, it is only through regularly established joint training and 
exercises that regional and local policies and tactics be refined and developed into routine 
procedures that are commonly understood. 
Rationale:  The analysis in this thesis identified the need for regularly established 
training for public safety responders and workforce to exercise the evacuation and 
response policies and procedures. As demonstrated by the full-scale practical exercise 
and indicated in the post-exercise survey, a low level of confidence (rating of 1 or 2 on a 
6-point scale) was provided by 16% of the respondents regarding the adequacy of 
training provided on the cross-disciplinary team method prior to this exercise. While the 
establishment of a policy or SOP can be considered one of the first steps towards 
implementing a cross-disciplinary response, individual and joint agency training will 
provide increased familiarity and enhanced competency with the administrative and 
operational policies established and a re-occurring method to identify administrative and 
operational deficiencies.   
Recommendations include the development and implementation of joint 
operational training that is based upon the established cross-disciplinary policy or SOP 
and focuses on the establishment of unified command to include police, fire, and EMS. 
Training can include a mixture of classroom, tabletop exercises, and operational training 
that can range from a specific discipline exercise to a full-scale multi-agency, multi-
jurisdictional exercise. While training can be agency specific, it is highly recommended 
that training include multiple agencies that would respond to a hostile or active shooter 
event and include localities and agencies that would respond through mutual aide or a 
federal response. Full-scale exercises should follow the Homeland Security Exercise and 
Evaluation Program (HSEEP) which provides a set of guiding principles for exercise 
programs as well as a common approach to exercise program management, design and 
development, conduct, evaluation, and improvement planning. The development of a 
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Corrective Action Plan (CAP) that documents the lessons learned, achievement of 
exercise objectives, as well as the feedback from the exercise participants and evaluators 
is warranted to sustain future improvements. 
C. SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
To date, limited research has been conducted on the implementation and use of 
cross-disciplinary teams comprised of public safety responders to include police, fire, and 
EMS. Most of the research regarding cross-disciplinary teams has been in the areas of 
education and corporate product development. What is needed is ongoing research that 
addresses the effectiveness of public safety cross-disciplinary teams. An example might 
be a trend analysis of cross-disciplinary team metrics including measures such as the 
overall time to triage, treat and transport victims, and the number of lives saved in a 
combined hostile or active shooter incident. Research into future incidents and public 
safety exercises could provide evidence regarding the effectiveness of the cross-
disciplinary team concept and examine whether or not it is accomplishing the desires as 
set forth by the policies being developed. 
While the basis of this thesis centered on the development of cross-disciplinary 
teams in a combined hostile or active shooter environment, further research is needed to 
identify if the social identity of established cross-disciplinary teams will lead to greater 
motivation, a greater sense of team cohesiveness, and enhanced performance on the scene 
of combined hostile or active shooter type events. Stinchcomb and Ordaz claim that 
social identity includes the values, norms, and behavioral expectations of the group or the 
“personality of the organization.”233  If the social identity factors do not enhance the 
effectiveness of the teams, research will hopefully tell us what social identity factors are 
leading to barriers regarding the effective performance of cross-disciplinary teams. 
Additional action research in the form of full-scale multi-disciplinary and multi-
jurisdictional exercises would prove to be beneficial. The goal of future research should 
be to further investigate the implementation of cross-disciplinary teams with the idea that 
233 Stinchcomb and Ordaz, “The Integration of Two ‘Brotherhoods’ into One Organizational 
Culture,” 145. 
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more data is needed to fully understand the impact of cross-disciplinary teams and the 
challenges in implementing them. One of those challenges might be different groups’ 
perspectives. This research included small sample sizes of different disciplinary groups 
and thus limited the ability to detect potential meaningful group differences; however 
studies with larger number of participants might surface important differences that need 
to be addressed for effective implementation. Even though the shootings at Columbine 
High School occurred in 1999, we are finally beginning to see greater attention and effort 
provided to altering our national, state, regional, and local public safety policies to adjust 
to this method of terrorism. National and regional response frameworks and policies such 
as those developed by the Washington Metropolitan COG and the Law Enforcement and 
Emergency Medical Services workgroup, the IAFF, and the United States Fire 
Administration, and policies developed by local jurisdictions are evidence of greater 
attention and polices that are being developed and continually redefined. While research 
associated with this thesis determined a moderate improvement in the ability of cross-
disciplinary teams to begin to initiate patient care and transportation of victims, we must 
determine if newly established policies, procedures, and tactical response methodologies, 
as well as the potential implementation of recommendations presented in this thesis, is 
effective to change the paradigm regarding the combined law enforcement, fire, and EMS 
cross-disciplinary response to hostile events. We must determine how to enable the full 
potential of cross-disciplinary teams to achieve their desired benefit.  
D. CONCLUSION 
The history of hostile or active shooter events in the United States has caused the 
first responders or law enforcement, fire, and emergency medical services to look at our 
response methodologies and standards of care to evaluate if we are matching the right 
resources with the environment that we are being presented with on these types of events. 
No longer can our first arriving emergency service personnel wait for specialized 
response teams to arrive while innocent victims continue to die. Our past practices and 
cultures must be adapted for new response methodologies aimed at saving the most 
amount of lives in a coordinated and effective manner. First arriving public safety 
responders must shift their paradigm and enter the areas of threat in a coordinated and 
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unified manner if the victims are to have improved chances of survival. For fire and EMS 
personnel, this means entering the area of indirect threat (warm zone) in a cross-
disciplinary team (Rescue Task Force) manner to identify, treat, and extract injured 
persons needing immediate lifesaving care.   
The research and analysis concluded in this thesis confirmed public safety 
responders have an overall moderately high level of confidence in the concept and use of 
cross-disciplinary teams, the ability of various disciplines to trust each other’s ability to 
work together, and the ability to communicate and share information. It was identified 
that some barriers existed in the ability to fully implement this concept without concern. 
The analysis provided overall support for the cross-disciplinary concept, but some issues 
need to be addressed such as the responder’s confidence in unified command to reduce 
the “staging time” for fire and EMS personnel and the confidence in the ability of cross-
disciplinary teams to enhance patient care and lead to a reduction time to triage, treat, and 
transport the victims. The amount of training responders received on this cross-
disciplinary concept was also rated lower. Future research will optimistically indicate that 
as joint operational policies and tactical procedures are solidified and practiced, 
operational barriers and issues such as those presented here will be resolved. What was 
concluded is the strong desire for joint operational policies and procedures that will 
establish and enhance the cross-disciplinary response regardless of our host agency and 
past cultural discipline. What was enlightening from this research was there was basically 
limited or no statistically significant difference in the perceptions of police, fire, EMS, 
and security towards the cross-disciplinary team concept.   
Procedures such as those utilized during past historical incidents aided in the 
identification of a need to change the individual agencies’ past practice of working 
independently rather than in a unified cross-disciplinary manner. Past practice and 
cultural barriers cannot impede the efforts of public safety responders to act in a 
coordinated and effective manner to overcome the new threats of terrorism that our 
communities and this country are facing. The success of cross-disciplinary teams is 
dependent on the integration of successful police tactics of stopping the threat in the 
shortest amount of time, integrating fire, EMS, and police tactics of accessing, providing 
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lifesaving emergency care, and removal of the victims from the area of threat. The 
success of this endeavor depends on the ability to integrate the cultures of police, fire, 
and EMS and create a new unified “public safety” culture that takes into account the 
successes and best practices of each of the participating agencies working toward a 
common mission.234   
  
234 Cartwright and Cooper. “The Role of Culture Compatibility in Successful Organizational 
Marriage,” 64. 
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APPENDIX A. “ACTIVE SHOOTER” TABLETOP EXERCISE 
QUESTIONS 
Q1. What has Security Operations Division done to mitigate the Active Shooter 
Threat?   
What is the purpose of each of the various participating agencies? 
Q2. Are there plans or procedures to address the Active Shooter threat? 
Q3. What types of activities are routinely conducted to promote our ability to respond 
to an Active Shooter Event? 
Q4. What actions will Security Operations Division elements take at this time? 
• Response to scene and throughout compound 
• ICP location 
• Internal/External notifications 
• Workforce notification 
• Interaction with law enforcement? 
• Aid to casualties 
Q5. What will other facility elements do at this time in the initial response phase? 
Q6. How does Security Operations Division and law enforcement interact and manage 
multiple scenes? 
Q7. How/when does the facility staff and fire and rescue access causalities? 
Q8. Who gives what information to the workforce?  Who else has been notified? 
Q9.  What will other agency elements do at this time in the response phase? 
Q10. How is the crime scene(s) handled by law enforcement? 
• Investigation  
• Evidence Collection 
Q11. How is patient accountability information being captured and shared between fire 
and rescue and agency personnel? 
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Q12. What types of information is provided to the agency workforce, external agencies, 
and media? 
Q13. Describe how the crisis response teams would activate and what support will the 
team provide? 
Q14. Describe how the Strategic Human Capital response team would activate and 
what actions the team would take? 




APPENDIX B. “ACTIVE SHOOTER” PRE FULL-SCALE 
EXERCISE QUESTIONS 
In preparation for the upcoming “Active Shooter” full scale exercise, we would 
like to get some baseline questions answered prior to the actual exercise.  Please respond 
based upon your knowledge and experience within your respective discipline. 
One of the goals of this exercise will be to involve the aspect of cross-functional 
teams or Rescue Task Force’s as they are sometimes called.  This will involve police 
officers and firefighters/paramedics working together in a team to perform basic patient 
assessment, treat life threatening injuries, extraction of the victims and provide for 
security of the team. 
 
1) What problems or issues do you expect from this ‘team concept” of police and fire 
working together? 
 
2) Do you think that the cross-functional team or “Rescue Task Force” concept as it is 
sometimes called is needed to accomplish the mission of Police, Fire and Building 
Security’s missions in an Active Shooter environment?  If not needed, why not? 
 
3) What are potential barriers to the success of this cross-functional team concept? 
 
4) What type of training, equipment or resources would you need to make the cross-
functional team concept a success? 
 
5) Do you think we in Fairfax County are prepared today to handle an “active shooter” 
incident such as Columbine or Mumbai, India?  Please elaborate if you can. 
 
Participant’s Discipline         
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APPENDIX C. “ACTIVE SHOOTER” POST FULL-SCALE 
EXERCISE QUESTIONS 
A goal of this exercise is to assess the effectiveness of cross-disciplinary teams 
(e.g. Rescue Task Forces and Extraction Task Forces).  These teams involve police 
officers, security officers, and fire/EMS personnel working together to perform patient 
assessment, treat life-threatening injuries, extract victims and provide security for the 
team.   
Instructions: 
• Please answer the following questions as they relate to your experience in 
a cross-disciplinary  team. 
• Please answer the questions in relation to procedures used in the past of 
Fire/EMS staging until the incident is declared “safe” by police. 
• Please circle N/A if the area was not observed or not applicable. 
• Please provide detailed explanations where applicable. 
 
a. The unified command post 
(police, fire/EMS, and 
security) was effective in 
making joint operational 
decisions. 
Strongly                                                      Strongly 
Disagree                                                         Agree 
   1         2         3        4          5         6           N/A 
 
b. Information sharing among 
exercise participants at the 
unified command post was 
effective in maintaining 
situational awareness and 
aided in the decision making 
process. 
Strongly                                                      Strongly 
Disagree                                                         Agree 
   1         2         3        4          5         6           N/A 
Explain: 
c. Accountability for the cross-
disciplinary team members 




Strongly                                                      Strongly 
Disagree                                                         Agree 
   1         2         3         4         5         6          N/A 
 
d. Effective unified command 
procedures aided in reducing 
the “staging time” for fire/
Strongly                                                       Strongly 
Disagree                                                          Agree 
   1         2         3         4         5         6          N/A 
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EMS personnel. 
e. Participants in this exercise 
received adequate training on 
this new cross-disciplinary 
team method before today’s 
exercise. 
Strongly                                                      Strongly 
Disagree                                                         Agree 
   1         2         3         4         5          6          N/A 
 
f. Personnel responding to this 
exercise understood each 
other’s agencies response 
procedures for mitigating an 
“Active Shooter” incident. 
Strongly                                                       Strongly 
Disagree                                                          Agree 
   1          2         3         4         5         6           N/A 
Explain: 
g. The use of terminology was 
commonly understood by all 
responders (police, security, 
and fire/EMS) during this 
exercise. 
Strongly                                                       Strongly 
Disagree                                                          Agree 
   1         2         3         4         5         6          N/A 
 
h. Cross-disciplinary teams 
(Rescue Task Force) 
enhanced the ability for fire/
EMS to be able to triage and 
treat the casualties in the 
warm zone. 
Strongly                                                       Strongly 
Disagree                                                          Agree 
   1         2         3         4         5         6          N/A 
Explain: 
i. Cross-disciplinary team 
members were provided with 
appropriate police force 
protection (security) while 
operating in the warm zone. 
 
Strongly                                                       Strongly 
Disagree                                                          Agree 
   1         2         3         4         5         6          N/A 
 
j. Appropriate work zones (Hot, 
Warm and Cold) were 
established and 
communicated to the cross-
disciplinary team members. 
Strongly                                                       Strongly 
Disagree                                                          Agree 
   1         2         3         4         5         6          N/A 
 
k. The identification of the 
casualty collection point and 
point(s) of entry was clearly 
communicated to the cross-
disciplinary team members. 
Strongly                                                       Strongly 
Disagree                                                          Agree 
   1        2          3         4         5         6          N/A 
 
l. Police, fire/EMS, and security 
personnel were clearly 
identifiable during this 
exercise. 
Strongly                                                       Strongly 
Disagree                                                          Agree 
   1         2         3         4         5         6           N/A 
 
m. Cross-disciplinary team 
members were provided with 
proper personal protective 
Strongly                                                        Strongly 
Disagree                                                          Agree 
   1         2         3         4         5         6          N/A 
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equipment (ballistic gear) and 
other equipment needed to 
triage, treat and extract 
causalities. 
Items Needed: 
n. Cross-disciplinary team 
members were empowered to 
make decisions regarding the 
establishment of tactical goals 
for the team. 
Strongly                                                       Strongly 
Disagree                                                          Agree 
   1         2         3         4          5         6          N/A 
Explain: 
o. This cross-disciplinary 
concept has led to a reduction 
in time to triage, treat and 
transport casualties from the 
warm zone during this 
exercise.  
Strongly                                                       Strongly 
Disagree                                                          Agree 
   1         2         3         4         5          6          N/A 
 
p. Police, fire/EMS and security 
trusted each other’s ability to 
perform during this exercise. 
Strongly                                                       Strongly 
Disagree                                                          Agree 
   1         2         3         4          5         6          N/A 
Explain: 
q. Cross-disciplinary team 
effectiveness was challenged 
by conflict among team 
members due to real or 
perceived differences in the 
establishment of goals and 
priorities for the team. 
Strongly                                                       Strongly 
Disagree                                                          Agree 
   1         2         3         4         5         6           N/A 
Explain: 
 
r. Cross-disciplinary team 
members were aware of their 
individual roles and 
responsibilities on this 
exercise. 
Strongly                                                       Strongly 
Disagree                                                          Agree 
   1         2         3         4          5         6          N/A 
 
s. Police, fire/EMS and security 
were willing to communicate 
and share information with 
each other during this 
exercise. 
Strongly                                                       Strongly 
Disagree                                                          Agree 
   1         2         3         4           5         6          N/A 
 
t. The individual cultures of 
police and fire/EMS provided 
a barrier to team effectiveness 
and collaboration during this 
exercise. 
Strongly                                                          Strongly 
Disagree                                                          Agree 
   1        2        3        4           5           6            N/A 
Explain: 
u. Top leadership in your 
organization is supportive of 
this new cross-disciplinary 
team concept/procedure. 
Strongly                                                       Strongly 
Disagree                                                          Agree 
   1         2         3         4         5         6           N/A 
Explain: 
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1. What are the advantages and disadvantages of using the cross-disciplinary ream 
approach for responding to and mitigating a hostile (active shooter) event in 
comparison to the former concept of fire/EMS staging until the incident is declared 
“safe” by police? 
 
Advantages of cross-disciplinary team: 
 
Disadvantages of cross-disciplinary team: 
 
 
2. Did the police, building security, and fire/EMS utilize teamwork to mitigate the 
incident or did they operate independently?  Please explain. 
 
3. What barriers existed to the cross-disciplinary teams of law enforcement and fire/





1. Were you an evaluator or a participant on this exercise? 
 
 
Circle One:   Evaluator  Participant 
 
 
2. If exercise evaluator, what area/function did you evaluate?     
 
3. Evaluator/Participant’s normal discipline  Circle One 
 
Police              Firefighter                 Firefighter/Paramedic               Security       
 
Administration               Other    
 
4. Did you participate as a member of the Cross-Disciplinary Team (police, fire/EMS)? 
 
Circle One: Yes   No 
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